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Abstract
We give a detailed characterization of optimal
trades under budget constraints in a prediction
market with a cost-function-based automated
market maker. We study how the budget con-
straints of individual traders affect their ability
to impact the market price. As a concrete ap-
plication of our characterization, we give suffi-
cient conditions for a property we call budget
additivity: two traders with budgets B and B′
and the same beliefs would have a combined im-
pact equal to a single trader with budget B +B′.
That way, even if a single trader cannot move
the market much, a crowd of like-minded traders
can have the same desired effect. When the
set of payoff vectors associated with outcomes,
with coordinates corresponding to securities, is
affinely independent, we obtain that a generaliza-
tion of the heavily-used logarithmic market scor-
ing rule is budget additive, but the quadratic mar-
ket scoring rule is not. Our results may be used
both descriptively, to understand if a particular
market maker is affected by budget constraints
or not, and prescriptively, as a recipe to construct
markets.
1 INTRODUCTION
A prediction market is a central clearinghouse for people
with differing opinions about the likelihood of an event—
say Hillary Clinton to win the 2016 U.S. Presidential
election—to trade monetary stakes in the outcome with one
another. At equilibrium, the price to buy a contract paying
$1 if Clinton wins reflects a consensus of sorts on the prob-
ability of the event. At that price, and given the wagers
already placed, no agent is willing to push the price further
up or down. Prediction markets have a good track record
of forecast accuracy in many domains [11, 19].
The design of combinatorial markets spanning multiple
logically-related events raises many interesting questions.
What information can be elicited—the full probability dis-
tribution, or specific properties of the distribution? What
securities can the market allow traders to buy and sell?
How can the market support and ensure a variety of trades?
For example, in addition to the likelihood of Clinton win-
ning the election, we may want to elicit information about
the distribution of her electoral votes.1 If we create one se-
curity for each possible outcome between 0 and 538, each
paying $1 iff Clinton gets exactly that many electoral votes,
the market is called complete, allowing us to elicit a full
probability distribution. Alternatively, if we create just two
securities, one paying out $x if Clinton wins x electoral
votes, and the other paying out $x2, we cannot elicit a full
distribution, but we can still elicit the mean and variance of
the number of electoral votes.
When agents are constrained in how much they can trade
only by risk aversion, prediction market prices can be in-
terpreted as a weighted average of traders’ beliefs [2, 20],
a natural reflection of the “wisdom of the crowd” with a
good empirical track record [14] and theoretical support
[2]. However, when agents are budget constrained, discon-
tinuities and idiosyncratic results can arise [7, 16] that call
into question whether the equilibrium prices can be trusted
to reflect any kind of useful aggregation.
We consider prediction markets with an automated market
maker [1, 4, 13] that maintains standing offers to trade ev-
ery security at some price. Unlike a peer-to-peer exchange,
all transactions route through the market maker. The com-
mon market makers have bounded loss and are (myopi-
cally) incentive compatible: the best (immediate) strategy
is for a trader to move the market prices of all securities
to equal his own belief. The design of such an automated
market maker boils down to choosing a convex cost func-
tion [1]. This amount of design freedom presents an oppor-
tunity to seek cost functions that satisfy additional desider-
ata such as computational tractability [1, 6].
1 A U.S. Presidential candidate receives a number of electoral
votes between 0 and 538. The candidate who receives a plurality
of electoral votes wins the election.
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Most of the literature assumes either risk-neutral or risk-
averse traders with unbounded budgets. In this paper, we
consider how agents with budget constraints trade in such
markets, a practical reality in almost all prediction markets
denominated in both real and virtual currencies. Our re-
sults help with a systematic study of the market’s liquidity
parameter, or the parameter controlling the sensitivity of
prices to trading volume. Setting the liquidity is a nearly
universal practical concern and, at present, is more (black)
art than science. We adopt the notion of the “natural budget
constraint” introduced by Fortnow and Sami [8]: the agent
is allowed only those trades for which the maximum loss
for any possible outcome does not exceed the budget.
The main contribution of this paper is a rich, geometric
characterization of the impact of budget constraints. Price
vectors, outcomes and trader beliefs are embedded in the
space of the same dimension as the number of securities.
Outcome vectors enumerate security payoffs; belief vec-
tors enumerate the traders’ expectations of payoffs. We
consider, for a fixed belief, the locus of the resulting price
vectors of an optimal trade as a function of the budget. We
show that the price vector moves in the convex hull of the
belief and the set of tight outcomes, in a direction that is
perpendicular to the set of tight outcomes. We also intro-
duce the concept of budget additivity: two agents with bud-
gets B and B′ and the same beliefs have the same power to
move the prices as a single agent with the same belief and
budgetB+B′. An absence of budget additivity points to an
inefficiency in incorporating information from the traders.
We show that budget additivity is a non-trivial property by
giving examples of market makers that do not satisfy bud-
get additivity. We give a set of sufficient conditions on the
market maker and the set of securities offered which guar-
antee budget additivity. Further, for two of the most com-
monly used market makers (the quadratic and logarithmic
market scoring rules), we show sufficient conditions on the
set of securities that guarantee budget additivity.
Of greatest practical interest is the application of our re-
sults to markets consisting of several independent ques-
tions, with each question priced according to a separate
logarithmic market scoring rule. This setup constitutes a
de facto industry standard, and the companies that use (or
used) it include Inkling Markets,2 Consensus Point,3 Mi-
crosoft and Yahoo! [17]. Our Theorems 5.6 and 5.8 show
that these markets are budget additive.
Previously, Fortnow and Sami [8] considered a different
question: do budget-constrained bidders always move the
market prices in the direction of their beliefs? They showed
that the answer to this is no: there always exist market
prices, beliefs and budgets such that the direction of price
movement is not towards the belief. We give a richer char-
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acterization of how the market prices move in the presence
of budget constraints, by charting the path the prices take
with increasing budgets. The impossibility result of Fort-
now and Sami [8] can be easily derived from our character-
ization (see Appendix D).4
A designer of a prediction market has a lot of freedom but
little guidance, and our results can be used both descrip-
tively and prescriptively. As a descriptive tool, our results
enable us to analyze commonly used market makers and
understand if budget constraints hamper information aggre-
gation in these markets. As a prescriptive tool, our results
can be used to construct markets that are budget additive. In
particular, we speculate that budget additivity simplifies the
choice of the liquidity parameter in the markets, because it
allows considering trader budgets in aggregate.
Proof overview and techniques. Our analysis borrows
heavily from techniques in convex analysis and builds on
the notion of Bregman divergence. We use the special case
of Euclidean distance (corresponding to a quadratic market
scoring rule) to form our geometric intuition which we then
extend to arbitrary Bregman divergences. For the sake of
an example, consider a complete market over a finite set of
outcomes, where the market prices lie in a simplex, exactly
coinciding with the set of probability distributions over out-
comes. Every possible outcome imposes a constraint on
the set of prices to which a trader can move the market, be-
cause the trader is not allowed to exceed the budget if that
outcome occurs. The prices satisfying this constraint form
a ball with the outcome at its center. The set of feasible
prices to which the trader can move the market is therefore
the intersection of these balls (see Figure 1).
The key structural result we obtain is the chart of the price
movement. Suppose that there is an infinite sequence of
agents with infinitesimally small budgets all with the same
belief. What is the path along which the prices move from
some initial values? This is determined by the agents’ be-
lief and the set of budget constraints that are tight at any
point, corresponding to the highest risk outcomes (out-
comes with the highest potential loss). We show that the
price vector can always be written as a convex combina-
tion of these highest risk outcomes and the agents’ belief.
Further, the market prices move in a direction that is per-
pendicular to the affine space of these outcomes.
The agents’ belief partitions the simplex interior into re-
gions, where each region is the interior of the convex hull
of the agent belief and a particular subset of outcomes. For
a region that is full-dimensional, every interior point can
be uniquely written as a convex combination of the agent
belief and all except one outcome. Assume that the current
price vector lies in this region. In the anticipation of the
further development, we call this outcome profitable and
others risky. Motivated by the characterization above, we
4The full version of this paper on arXiv includes the appendix.
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Figure 1: Left: ◦ —current state, × —belief,  —optimal action for a given belief and budget. Three circles bound the
allowed final states for budget 0.1. We plot optimal actions for two different beliefs. Right: A path from the initial state to
the belief, consisting of optimal actions for increasing budgets.
move perpendicular to the risky outcomes in the direction
towards the agents’ belief. As a result, we increase the risk
of risky outcomes (equally for all outcomes), while getting
closer to the one profitable outcome (and hence increas-
ing its profit). The characterization then guarantees that the
prices along this path are indeed those chosen by traders at
increasing budgets, because the risky outcomes yield tight
constraints.
We would like the same to be true for the lower dimensional
regions as well; that is, for the set of tight constraints to
be exactly the corresponding set of outcomes defining the
convex hull. In fact, this property is sufficient to guaran-
tee budget additivity. The markets for which the tight con-
straints are exactly the minimal set of outcomes that define
the region the price lies in are budget additive. (We conjec-
ture that the converse holds as well.) The entire path is then
as follows: w.l.o.g. you start at a full-dimensional region,
move along the perpendicular until you hit the boundary of
the region and you are in a lower-dimensional region, move
along the perpendicular in this lower-dimensional region,
and so on until you reach the belief (see Figure 1). The set
of tight constraints is monotonically decreasing. We show
that such markets are characterized by a certain acute an-
gles assumption on the set of possible outcomes. Loosely
speaking, this assumption guarantees that outcomes out-
side the minimal set behave as the profitable outcome in
the above example.
Other related work. There is a rich literature on scor-
ing rules and prediction markets. Two of the most stud-
ied scoring rules are the quadratic scoring rule [3] and the
logarithmic market scoring rule [13]. We consider cost-
function-based prediction markets [4, 12], a fully general
class under reasonable assumptions [1, 5]. Their equiva-
lence with proper scoring rules has been implicitly noted
by Gneiting and Raftery [10]. Several authors have studied
relationships between utility functions and price dynamics
in prediction markets, drawing a parallel to online learning
[2, 5, 9]. Our analysis touches on the problem of setting the
market maker’s liquidity parameter [15, 17], which deter-
mines how (in)sensitive prices are to trading volume. With
budget additivity, the market designer can optimize liquid-
ity according to aggregate budgets, without worrying about
how budgets are partitioned among traders.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Securities and payoffs. Consider a probability space with
a finite set of outcomes Ω ⊆ Rn. A security is a financial
instrument whose payoff depends on the realization of an
outcome in Ω. In other words, the payoff of a security is
a random variable of the probability space. We consider
trading with n securities corresponding to n coordinates of
the outcomes ω ∈ Ω. A security can be traded before the
realization is observed with the intention that the price of a
security serves as a prediction for the expected payoff, i.e.,
the expected value of the corresponding coordinate.
Cost function, prices and utilities. An automated mar-
ket maker always offers to trade securities, for the right
price. In fact the price vector is the current prediction of
the market maker for the expectation of ω. A cost func-
tion based market maker is based on a differentiable con-
vex cost function, C : Rn → R. It is a scalar function of an
n-dimensional vector q ∈ Rn representing the number of
outstanding shares5 for our n securities. We also refer to q
as the state of the market.
The vector of instantaneous prices of the securities is sim-
ply the gradient of C at q, denoted by p(q) := ∇C(q).
The prices of securities change continuously as the secu-
rities are traded, so it is useful to consider the cost of
trading a given quantity of securities. The cost of buy-
ing δ ∈ Rn units of securities (where a negative value
corresponds to selling) is determined by the path integral∫
pi
p(q¯) · dq¯ = C(q + δ) − C(q), where pi is any smooth
5We allow trading fractions of a security. Negative values cor-
respond to short-selling.
curve from q to q + δ.
When the outcome ω is realized, the vector of δ units of
securities pays off an amount of δ · ω. Thus, the realized
utility of a trader whose trade δ moved the market state
from q to q′ = q + δ is
U(q′, ω; q) := (q′ − q) · ω − C(q′) + C(q) .
We make a standard assumption that the maximum achiev-
able utility, which is also the maximum loss of the market
maker, is bounded by a finite constant (in Section 4, we in-
troduce a standard approach to check this easily). LetM
be the convex hull of the payoff vectors,M := conv(Ω). It
is easy to see thatM contains exactly the vectors µ ∈ Rn
which can be realized as expected payoffs E[ω] for some
probability distribution over Ω. For a trader who believes
that E[ω] = µ, the expected utility takes form
U(q′, µ; q) := E [U(q′, ω; q)] = (q′−q)·µ−C(q′)+C(q) .
Throughout, we consider a single myopic trader who trades
as if he were the last to trade. A key property satisfied by
expected utility is path independence: for any q, q¯, q′ ∈
Rn, U(q′, µ; q¯) + U(q¯, µ; q) = U(q′, µ; q), that is, risk-
neutral traders have no incentive to split their trades. For a
risk-neutral trader, q′ ∈ Rn is an optimal action if and only
if µ = ∇C(q′) = p(q′) (this follows from the first-order
optimality conditions). In other words, the trader is incen-
tivized to move the market to the prices corresponding to
his belief as long as such prices exist. In general, there may
be multiple states yielding the same prices, so the inverse
map p−1(µ) returns a set, which can be empty if no state
yields the price vector µ.
Commonly-used cost functions include the quadratic cost,
logarithmic market-scoring rule (LMSR) and the log-
partition function. They are described in detail in Ap-
pendix A. The quadratic cost is defined by C(q) = 12‖q‖22
and p(q) = q. Log-partition function is defined as C(q) =
ln(
∑
ω∈Ω e
q·ω). It subsumes LMSR as a special case for
the complete market with the outcomes corresponding to
vertices of the simplex. The prices under log-partition cost
correspond to the expected value of ω under the distribution
Pq(ω) = e
q·ω−C(q) over Ω, i.e., p(q) = EPq [ω].
Budget constraints. Trading in prediction markets needs
an investment of capital. It is possible that an agent loses
money on the trade, in particular U(q′, ω; q) could be neg-
ative for some ω. One restriction on how an agent trades
could be that he is unable to sustain a big loss, due to a bud-
get constraint. We consider the notion of natural budget
constraint defined by Fortnow and Sami [8] which states
that the loss of the agent is at most his budget, for all ω ∈ Ω.
Given a starting market state q0 and a budget of B ≥ 0, a
trader with the belief µ ∈M then solves the problem:
max
q∈Rn
U(q, µ; q0)
s.t. U(q, ω; q0) ≥ −B ∀ω ∈ Ω .
(2.1)
For quadratic costs, each constraint corresponds to a sphere
with one of the outcomes at its center, so the feasible region
is an intersection of these spheres. We will later see that
this generalizes to an intersection of balls w.r.t. a Bregman
divergence for general costs.
In general, there may be multiple q optimizing this objec-
tive. In the following definition we introduce notation for
various solution sets we will be analyzing. The belief µ is
fixed throughout most of the discussion, so we suppress the
dependence on µ.
Definition 2.1 (Solution sets). Let Qˆ(B; q0) denote the set
of solutions of Convex Program (2.1) for a fixed initial state
and budget. Let Qˆ(q0) =
⋃
B≥0 Qˆ(B; q0) denote the set of
solutions of (2.1) for a fixed initial state across all budgets.
Let Qˆ(ν; q0) = p−1(ν) ∩ Qˆ(q0) denote the set of states q
that optimize (2.1) for some budget B and yield the market
price vector ν.
The next theorem shows that solutions for a fixed initial
state and budget always yield the same price vector. It is
proved in Appendix B.
Theorem 2.2. If q, q′ ∈ Qˆ(B; q0), then p(q) = p(q′).
Geometry of linear spaces. We finish this section by re-
viewing a few standard geometric definitions we use in next
sections. Let X ⊆ Rn. Then aff(X) denotes the affine hull
of the set X (i.e., the smallest affine space including X).
We write X⊥ to denote the orthogonal complement of X:
X⊥ := {u ∈ Rn : u · (x′ − x) = 0 for all x, x′ ∈ X}.
We use the convention ∅⊥ = Rn. A set K ∈ Rn is called a
cone if it is closed under multiplication by positive scalars.
If a cone is convex, it is also closed under addition. Since Ω
is finite, the realizable setM = conv(Ω) is a polytope. Its
boundary can be decomposed into faces. More precisely,
X ⊆ Ω, X 6= ∅, forms a face of M if X is the set of
maximizers over Ω of some linear function.6 We also view
X = ∅ as a face of M. With this definition, for any two
faces X , X ′, also their intersection X ∩X ′ is a face.
3 CHARACTERIZING SOLUTION SETS
We start with the optimality (KKT) conditions for the Con-
vex Program (2.1), as characterized by the next lemma.
One of the key conditions is that the solution prices must be
in the convex hull of the belief µ and all the ω’s for which
the budget constraints are tight. The set of tight constraints
is always a face of the polytopeM. We allow an empty set
as a face, which corresponds to the case when none of the
constraints are tight and the solution prices coincide with
µ. The proof follows by analyzing KKT conditions (see
Appendix C of the full version for details).
6Strictly speaking, this is the definition of an exposed face,
but all faces of a polytope are exposed, so the distinction does not
matter here. The exposed face is typically defined to be conv(X),
but in this paper, it is more convenient to work withX directly.
Lemma 3.1 (KKT lemma). Let q0 ∈ Rn. Then q ∈
Qˆ(B; q0) if and only if there exists a face X ⊆ Ω such
that the following conditions hold:
(a) U(q, x; q0) = U(q, x′; q0), or equivalently
(q − q0) · (x′ − x) = 0, for all x, x′ ∈ X
(b) U(q, ω; q0) ≥ U(q, x; q0), or equivalently
(q − q0) · (ω − x) ≥ 0, for all x ∈ X , ω ∈ Ω\X
(c) p(q) ∈ conv(X ∪ {µ})
(d) B = −U(q, x; q0) for all x ∈ X if X 6= ∅, or
B ≥ maxω∈Ω[−U(q, ω; q0)] if X = ∅
where conditions (a) and (b) hold vacuously for X = ∅.
The condition (a) requires that q − q0 be orthogonal to the
active setX . The set of points satisfying conditions (a) and
(c) will be called the Bregman perpendicular and will be
defined in the next section. The condition (b) is a statement
about acuteness of the angle between q − q0 (the perpen-
dicular) and the outcomes. It will be the basis of our acute
angles assumption. The condition (d) just states how the
budget is related to the active set X .
Witness cones and minimal faces. We now introduce
some notation to help us state reinterpretations of the con-
ditions in Lemma 3.1. First of all, given a face X , what
is the set of q’s that satisfy conditions (a) and (b)? This is
captured by what we call the witness cone.
Definition 3.2. The witness cone for a face X ⊆ Ω is de-
fined as K(X) := {u ∈ Rn : u · (ω − x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈
X,ω ∈ Ω} if X 6= ∅, and K(X) := Rn if X = ∅.
The following two properties of witness cones are immedi-
ate from the definition:
• Anti-monotonicity: if X ⊆ X ′, then K(X) ⊇ K(X ′).
• Orthogonality: K(X) ⊆ X⊥.
A state q satisfies conditions (a) and (b) for a given face X
if and only if q−q0 ∈ K(X). Now given a state q, consider
the set of faces that could satisfy condition (c). This set has
a useful structure, namely that there is a unique minimal
face (proved in Appendix C of the full version).
Definition 3.3. Given a price vector ν ∈ M, the minimal
face for ν is the minimal face X (under inclusion) s.t. ν ∈
conv(X ∪ {µ}). The minimal face for ν is denoted as Xν .
With the existence of a minimal face and the anti-
monotonicity of the witness sets, it follows that if q and
X satisfy conditions (a), (b) and (c), then so do q and
Xp(q). Thus we obtain the following version of Lemma 3.1
(proved in Appendix C of the full version).
Theorem 3.4 (Characterization of Solution Sets). q ∈
Qˆ(q0) if and only if q ∈ [q0 +K(Xp(q))].
Using Theorem 3.4, we immediately obtain a characteriza-
tion of when a price vector ν could be the price vector of
an optimal solution to (2.1).
Corollary 3.5. Qˆ(ν; q0) = p−1(ν) ∩ [q0 + K(Xν)]. In
particular, ν is the price vector of an optimal solution to
(2.1) if and only if p−1(ν) ∩ [q0 +K(Xν)] 6= ∅.
We now study an example using the above characteriza-
tion. More examples can be found in Appendix E of the
full version.
Example 3.6 (Quadratic cost on an obtuse triangle; see Ex-
ample E.2 in the full version for details). Consider the fol-
lowing outcome space, belief, and the sequence of market
states (depicted in Figure 2):
ω1 = (0.0, 0.0) q0 = ν0 =
11
14ω2 +
3
14ω3
ω2 = (1.8, 0.0) q1 = ν1 =
1
3ω2 +
2
3µ
ω3 = (6.0, 4.2) q2 = ν2 =
1
9ω1 +
8
9µ
µ = qµ = (2.7, 1.8) q3 = ν3 ≈ 119ω1 + 1819µ
Using the KKT lemma, we can show for j = 1, 2, 3, that
qj = νj is an optimal action at qj−1 = νj−1 under belief
µ, with the corresponding budgets as:
ω1 ω2 ω3
U(q1, ·; q0) 0.45 −0.09 −0.09 B01 = 0.09
U(q2, ·; q1) −0.56 −0.56 1.12 B12 = 0.56
U(q3, ·; q2) −0.565 −0.28 . . . 0.82 . . . B23 = 0.565
U(qµ, ·; q0) −1.215 −1.215 2.565 B0µ = 1.215
The above table also shows that the budget B0µ = 1.215
suffices to move directly from q0 to qµ. However, note that
the sum B01 + B12 + B23 = 1.215 = B0µ, but ν3 6= µ,
i.e., after the sequence of optimal actions with budgetsB01,
B12, and B23, the market is still not at the belief shared by
all agents, even though with the budget B0µ, it would have
reached it.
Budget additivity. The above example suggests that
multiple traders with the same belief may have less power
in moving the market state towards their belief compared
to a single trader with the same belief and the combined
budget. Since prediction markets aim to efficiently aggre-
gate information from agents, it is natural to ask under what
conditions multiple traders with the same beliefs do have a
combined impact equal to a single trader with the combined
budget.
Next, we formally define this property as budget additivity.
We then define the Euclidean version of the acute angles
condition that we show is sufficient for budget additivity.
Definition 3.7 (Budget additivity). We say that a prediction
market is budget additive onM′ ⊆M if for all beliefs µ ∈
M′ and all initial states q0 ∈ p−1(M′) the following holds:
For any budgets B,B′ ≥ 0 and any sequence of solutions
q ∈ Qˆ(B; q0) and q′ ∈ Qˆ(B′; q), we have p(q), p(q′) ∈
M′ and q′ ∈ Qˆ(B +B′; q0).
In other words, the market is budget additive if the se-
quence of optimal actions of two agents with the same be-
ω1 ω2
ν0
ν1
ν2
ν3 µ
ω1 ω2
ω3
ω4
A0.2
A0.4
A0.6
A0.8
Figure 2: Left: An example of non-additive budgets when payoffs form obtuse angles (see Example 3.6 and its extended
version Example E.2 in the full version). Right: An examples of a non-linear perpendicular for the log-partition cost.
lief and budgetsB andB′ is also an optimal action of a sin-
gle agent with the same belief and a larger budget B +B′.
Thanks to Theorem 2.2 we then also obtain that the price
vector following the sequence of optimal actions by the two
agents is the same as the price vector after the optimal ac-
tion by an agent with the combined budget (all with the
same beliefs).
We now state the acute angles assumption for the Euclidean
case, to give an intuition. Our acute angles assumption
(Definition 5.1) is a generalization of this. We later show
that the acute angles property is sufficient for budget addi-
tivity (Theorem 5.2).
Definition 3.8. We say that the Euclidean acute angles
hold for a face X , if the angle between any point ν¯ ∈ M,
its projection on the affine hull of X and any payoff ω ∈ Ω
is non-obtuse (the angle is measured at the projection).
Based on the above example, one may hypothesize that the
obtuse angles are to blame for the lack of budget additivity.
In the following sections we will show that this is indeed
the case, but that the notion of obtuse/acute angles depends
on the Bregman divergence. In particular, the above ex-
ample would have been budget-additive if we used the log-
partition cost instead of the quadratic cost.
4 BREGMAN DIVERGENCE AND
PERPENDICULARS
We will see next that the utility function U can be writ-
ten as the difference of two terms measuring the distance
between the belief and the market state before and after
the trade. This distance measure is the mixed Bregman
divergence.7 To define the Bregman divergence, first let
C∗ : Rn → (−∞,∞] be the convex conjugate of C de-
fined as C∗(ν) := supq′∈Rn [q
′ · ν − C(q′)] . Since C∗ is
a supremum of linear functions, it is convex lower semi-
continuous. Up to a constant, it characterizes the maximum
achievable utility on an outcome ω for a fixed initial state q
7Our notion of Bregman divergence is more general than typ-
ically assumed in the literature.
as supq′∈Rn U(q
′, ω; q) = C∗(ω)+
[
C(q)−q·ω]. The term
in the brackets is always finite, but C∗ might be positive
infinite. We make a standard assumption that C∗(ω) < ∞
for all ω ∈ Ω, i.e., that the maximum achievable utility,
which is also the maximum loss of the market maker, is
bounded by a finite constant. By convexity, this implies
that C∗(µ) < ∞ for all µ ∈ M. The Bregman divergence
derived from C is a function D : Rn × Rn → (−∞,∞]
measuring the maximum expected utility under belief µ at
a state q
D(q, µ) := C(q) +C∗(µ)− q ·µ = supq′∈Rn U(q′, µ; q) .
From the convexity ofC andC∗ and the definition ofC∗, it
is clear that: (i) D is convex and lower semi-continuous in
each argument separately; (ii) D is non-negative; and (iii)
D is zero iff p(q) = ∇C(q) = µ. By the bounded loss
assumption, Bregman divergence is finite on µ ∈ M. For
µ ∈M, we can write
U(q′, µ; q) = D(q, µ)−D(q′, µ) . (4.1)
Thus, maximizing the expected utility is the same as min-
imizing the Bregman divergence between the state q′ and
the belief µ. From Eq. (4.1) it is also clear that each con-
straint in (2.1) is equivalent to D(q, ω) ≤ D(q0, ω) + B,
and the geometric interpretation is that the agent seeks to
find the state closest to his belief, within the intersection of
Bregman balls
For the quadratic cost, we have C∗(ν) = 12‖ν‖2 and
D(q, ν) = 12‖q − ν‖2, i.e., the Bregman divergence co-
incides with the Euclidean distance squared. For log-
partition cost, we have C∗(ν) =
∑
ω∈Ω Pν(ω) lnPν(ω)
where Pν is the distribution maximizing entropy among P
satisfying EP [ω] = ν. The Bregman divergence is the KL-
divergence between Pq and Pν : D(q, ν) = KL(Pν‖Pq).
Convex analysis. We overview a few standard defini-
tions and results from convex analysis. For X ⊆ Rn,
we write riX for the relative interior of X (i.e., the in-
terior relative to the affine hull). For a convex function
F : Rn → (−∞,∞], we define its effective domain
as domF := {u ∈ Rn : F (u) < ∞} (i.e., the set
of points where it is finite). The subdifferential of F at
a point u is the set ∂F (u) := {v ∈ Rn : F (u′) ≥
F (u) + (u′ − u) · v for all u′ ∈ Rn}. We say that F is
subdifferentiable at u if ∂F (u) 6= ∅. A standard result of
convex analysis states that F is always subdifferentiable on
a superset of ri domF . If F is not only convex, but also
lower semi-continuous, then ∂F and ∂F ∗ are inverses in
the sense that v ∈ ∂F (u) iff u ∈ ∂F ∗(v). If F is differ-
entiable everywhere on Rn, then F ∗ is strictly convex on
ri domF ∗.
Let im p := {p(q) : q ∈ Rn} denote the set of prices
that can be expressed by market states. The implications
for our setting are that: (i) C∗ is subdifferentiable on im p;
(ii) p−1(ν) = ∂C∗(ν) for all ν ∈ Rn; (iii) all beliefs
in ri domC∗ can be expressed by some state q; (iv) C∗
is strictly convex on ri domC∗, and similarly D(q, ν) is
strictly convex on ri domC∗ as a function of the second
argument.
Assumptions on the cost function.
• Convexity and differentiability onRn. C is convex and
differentiable on Rn.
• Finite loss.M⊆ domC∗, i.e., C∗ is finite onM.
• Inclusion of the relative interior. riM⊆ ri domC∗.
The first two assumptions are standard. The third assump-
tion is a regularity condition that we require in our re-
sults. Here we briefly discuss how it compares with the
finite loss assumption. While the two assumptions look
similar, neither of them implies the other. For example,
if domC∗ is an n-dimensional simplex and M is one of
its lower dimensional faces, which are lower dimensional
simplices, then the finite loss assumption holds, but the in-
clusion assumption does not. Similarly, for n = 1 and
M = [0, 1], the inclusion assumption is satisfied by the
conjugate C∗(ν) = 1/ν + 1/(1 − ν) on ν ∈ (0, 1) and
C∗(ν) = ∞ on ν 6∈ (0, 1), but this conjugate does not
satisfy the finite loss assumption.
We do not view the inclusion assumption as very restric-
tive, since it is satisfied by many common cost functions.
For instance, it always holds when C is constructed as in
[1], because their construction guarantees domC∗ = M.
However, the inclusion assumption might not hold for cost
functions that allow arbitrage (e.g., [6]).
Our main result relies on strict convexity of C∗ on
ri domC∗, so some of our statements will require that
the market prices and beliefs lie in that set. The inclu-
sion assumption above guarantees that at the minimum
riM ⊆ ri domC∗, but the boundary of M is not neces-
sarily included. To allow some generality beyond riM, we
define the set
M˜ :=
{
M ifM⊆ ri domC∗
riM otherwise.
In either case we obtain that M˜ ⊆ ri domC∗ ⊆ im p,
i.e., beliefs in M˜ can be expressed by some state q. For
the quadratic cost, M˜ = M. For the log-partition cost,
M˜ = riM.
Perpendiculars. We now define the notion of a Bregman
perpendicular to an affine space. This is a constructive def-
inition. It plays a central role in the definition of the acute
angles assumption, and also in the proof of the main result
(Theorem 5.2). We will see that the set of optimal price
vectors for different budgets is a sequence of Bregman per-
pendiculars. Naturally, perpendiculars are closely related
to the conditions in Lemma 3.1; in particular to the set of
q’s that satisfy conditions (a) and (c) for a given face X .
For quadratic costs, Bregman perpendiculars coincide with
the usual Euclidean perpendiculars. Consider an affine
space and a point not in it. A projection of the point onto
the space is the point in the space that is closest in Eu-
clidean distance to the given point. Now consider moving
this affine space towards the projected point. The locus of
the projection as we move the space is the perpendicular to
the space through the given point. We extend this definition
to arbitrary Bregman divergences by defining the projection
using the corresponding Bregman divergence.
A Bregman perpendicular is determined by three geomet-
ric objects within the affine hull aff(domC∗). The first of
these is an affine space, say A0 ⊆ aff(domC∗). The sec-
ond is a point a1 ∈ aff(domC∗)\A0. The affine space
A = aff(A0 ∪ {a1}) ⊆ aff(domC∗) will be the ambi-
ent space that will contain the perpendicular. Define par-
allel spaces to A0 in A, for an arbitrary point a0 ∈ A0, as
Aλ := A0 +λ(a1− a0) for λ ∈ R. Note that the definition
of Aλ is independent of the choice of a0. The third geo-
metric object is a market state q ∈ Rn such that p(q) ∈ A.
For technical reasons, we will define a perpendicular at q
rather than a more natural notion, which would be at p(q).
Our reason for switching into q-space is that inner products,
defining optimality of the Bregman projection, are between
elements of q-space and ν-space (the two spaces coincide
for Euclidean distance). For all λ ∈ R define a Bregman
projection of q onto Aλ as
νλ := argmin
ν∈Aλ
D(q, ν) .
Since D(q, ν) is bounded from below and lower semi-
continuous, the minimum is always attained (but it may be
equal to ∞). If it is attained at more than one point, we
choose an arbitrary minimizer. Whenever we can choose
νλ ∈ ri domC∗, this νλ must be the unique minimizer by
strict convexity of D(q, ·) on ri domC∗, and the minimum
is finite. We use these νλ’s to define the perpendicular:
Definition 4.1. Given A0, a1 and q as above, the a1-
perpendicular to A0 at q is a map γ : λ 7→ νλ defined
over λ ∈ Λ := {λ ∈ R : νλ ∈ ri domC∗}. We call Λ
the domain of the perpendicular. We define a total order on
νλ, νλ′ ∈ im γ as νλ  νλ′ iff λ ≤ λ′.
In Appendix F.2 of the full version, we show that per-
pendiculars are continuous maps. The name perpendicu-
lar is justified by the following proposition which matches
our Euclidean intuition that the perpendiculars can be ob-
tained by intersecting the ambient space A with the affine
space which passes through q and is orthogonal to A0. It
also shows that the perpendicular corresponds to the set of
prices that satisfy conditions (a) and (c) with the convex
hull relaxed to the affine hull (when A0 is the affine hull
of face X , point a1 coincides with µ and q is the initial
state). Recall that for an arbitrary set X ⊆ Rn, its orthog-
onal complement is defined as X⊥ := {u : u · (x′ − x) =
0 for all x, x′ ∈ X}.
Proposition 4.2. Let γ be the a1-perpendicular to A0 at q,
and let A = aff(A0 ∪ {a1}). The following two statements
are equivalent for any ν′ ∈ Rn:
(i) ν′ ∈ im γ
(ii) ν′ ∈ A ∩ (ri domC∗), p−1(ν′) ∩ (q +A⊥0 ) 6= ∅
Proposition 4.2 is proved in Appendix F of the full ver-
sion. The perpendiculars have the following closure prop-
erty which is useful for showing budget additivity (also
proved in Appendix F of the full version):
Proposition 4.3. Under the assumptions of Proposi-
tion 4.2, γ is also the a1-perpendicular to A0 at any q′ ∈
p−1(im γ) ∩ (q +A⊥0 ).
5 BUDGET ADDITIVITY
We now state the acute angles property which links the
Bregman perpendicular and Corollary 3.5, and is sufficient
for budget additivity.
Definition 5.1. We say that the acute angles hold for a face
X , if for every µ-perpendicular γ to X at q, such that µ ∈
M˜ and q ∈ p−1(M˜), the following holds: If ν′ ∈ im γ
and ν′  p(q), then p−1(ν′) ∩ [q +K(X)] 6= ∅.
The motivation for the name “acute angles” comes from the
Euclidean distance case, where this assumption is equiva-
lent to Definition 3.8 (see Proposition G.1 in the full ver-
sion). The acute angles property is non-trivial and we have
seen that without this property, budget additivity need not
hold; we conjecture that it is also a necessary condition.
After stating the main theorem, we analyze in more detail
when the acute angles are satisfied by the quadratic and
log-partition costs.
We now state the main result, that the acute angles are suf-
ficient for budget additivity:
Theorem 5.2 (Sufficient conditions for budget additivity).
If acute angles hold for every face X ⊆ Ω, then the predic-
tion market is budget additive on M˜.
Sufficient conditions for acute angles. We next give the
sufficient conditions when the acute angles hold for the
quadratic and log-partition cost functions. We also show
that the acute angles hold for all one-dimensional outcome
spaces, and that they are preserved by taking direct sums of
markets. Recall that a set K ∈ Rn is called a cone if it is
closed under multiplication by positive scalars. A cone is
called acute, if x · y ≥ 0 for all x, y ∈ K. An affine cone
with the vertex a0 is a set K′ of the form a0 + K where K
is a cone.
Theorem 5.3 (Sufficient condition for quadratic cost). Let
X be a face and A′ be the affine space a0 + X⊥ for an
arbitrary a0 ∈ aff(X). Acute angles hold for the face X
and the quadratic cost if and only if the projection of Ω (or,
equivalently,M) onA′ is contained in an affine acute cone
with the vertex a0.
Corollary 5.4. Acute angles hold for the quadratic cost
and a hypercube Ω = {0, 1}n.
Corollary 5.5. Acute angles hold for the quadratic cost
and simplex Ω = {ei : i ∈ [n]} where [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}
and ei is the i-th vector of the standard basis in Rn.
Theorem 5.6 (Log-partition over affinely independent out-
comes). If the set Ω is affinely independent then acute an-
gles assumption is satisfied for the log-partition cost.
Theorem 5.7 (One-dimensional outcome spaces). Acute
angles hold for any cost function ifM is a line segment.
Let Ω1 ⊆ Rn1 and Ω2 ⊆ Rn2 be outcome spaces with costs
C1 andC2. We define the direct sum of Ω1 and Ω2 to be the
outcome space Ω = Ω1 × Ω2 with the cost C : Rn1+n2 →
R defined as C(q1, q2) = C1(q1) + C2(q2).
Theorem 5.8 (Acute angles for direct sums). If acute an-
gles hold for Ω1 with cost C1, and Ω2 with cost C2, then
they also hold for their direct sum.
As a direct consequence of this theorem, we obtain that
the log-partition cost function satisfies the acute angles as-
sumption on a hypercube. More generally, any direct sum
of costs on line segments satisfies the acute angles. This
means that all cost-based prediction markets consisting of
independent binary questions are budget additive, regard-
less of costs used to price individual questions.
As mentioned in the introduction, a vast number of de-
ployed cost-based prediction markets consists of indepen-
dent questions (not necessarily binary), each priced accord-
ing to an LMSR (i.e., a log-partition cost on a simplex).
Theorems 5.6 and 5.8 imply that this industry standard is
budget additive.
5.1 Proof of Theorem 5.2
In this section we sketch the proof of Theorem 5.2 (for a
complete proof see Appendix H of the full version). We
proceed in several steps. Let ν0 = p(q0). Assuming acute
angles, we begin by constructing an oriented curve L join-
ing ν0 with µ, by sequentially choosing portions of per-
pendiculars for monotonically decreasing active sets. We
then show that budget additivity holds for any solutions
with prices in L, and finally show that the curve L is the
locus of the optimal prices of solutions Qˆ(q0), as well as
optimal prices of solutions Qˆ(q) for any q ∈ Qˆ(q0).
Part 1: Construction of the solution path L. In this part,
we construct:
• a sequence of prices ν0, ν1, . . . , νk with ν0 = p(q0)
and νk = µ
• a sequence of oriented curves `0, . . . , `k−1 where each
`i goes from νi to νi+1
• a monotone sequence of sets Ω ⊇ X0 ⊃ X1 ⊃
· · · ⊃ Xk = ∅, such that the following minimal-
ity property holds: Xi is the minimal face for all
ν ∈ (im `i)\{νi+1} for i ≤ k − 1, and Xk is the
minimal face for νk.
• a sequence of states q1, . . . , qk−1 such that qi ∈
p−1(νi) ∩ [qi−1 +K(Xi−1)]
The curves `i will be referred to as segments. The curve
obtained by concatenating the segments `0 through `k−1
will be called the solution path and denoted L. In the spe-
cial case that ν0 = µ, we have k = 0, X0 = ∅ and L is a
degenerate curve with imL = {µ}.
If ν0 6= µ, we construct the sequence of segments it-
eratively. Let X0 6= ∅ be the minimal face such that
ν0 ∈ conv(X0 ∪ {µ}). By the minimality, µ 6∈ aff(X0).
Let γ be the µ-perpendicular to aff(X0) at q0. The curve γ
passes through ν0 and eventually reaches the boundary of
conv(X0 ∪ {µ}) at some ν1 by continuity of γ (see Theo-
rem F.3). Let segment `0 be the portion of γ going from ν0
to ν1.
This construction gives us the first segment `0. There are
two possibilities:
1. ν1 = µ; in this case we are done;
2. ν1 lies on a lower-dimensional face of conv(X0 ∪
{µ}); in this case, we pick some q1 ∈ p−1(ν1)∩ [q0 +
K(X0)], which can be done by the acute angles as-
sumption, and use the above construction again, start-
ing with q1, and obtaining a new set X1 ⊂ X0 and a
new segment `1; and iterate.
The above process eventually ends, because with each iter-
ation, the size of the active set decreases. This construction
yields monotonicity of Xi and the minimality property.
The above construction yields a specific sequence of qi ∈
p−1(νi) ∩ [qi−1 + K(Xi−1)]. We show in Appendix H of
the full version that actually qi ∈ p−1(νi) ∩ (q0 + X⊥i−1)
and that the construction of L is independent of the choice
of q1, q2, . . . , qk−1.
Part 2: Budget additivity for points on L. Let ν, ν′ ∈
imL such that ν  ν′. Let q ∈ Qˆ(ν; q0) and q′ ∈ Qˆ(ν′; q)
such that q ∈ Qˆ(B; q0) and q′ ∈ Qˆ(B′; q). In this part we
show that q′ ∈ Qˆ(B +B′; q0).
First, consider the case that ν′ = µ. To see that q′ ∈
Qˆ(B + B′; q0), first note that the constraints of Convex
Program (2.1) hold, because U(q′, ω; q0) = U(q′, ω; q) +
U(q, ω; q0) ≥ −B′ − B for all ω by path independence of
the utility function. As noted in the introduction, in the ab-
sence of constraints, the utility U(q¯, µ; q0) is maximized at
any q¯ with p(q¯) = µ. Thus, q′ is a global maximizer of the
utility and satisfies the constraints, so q′ ∈ Qˆ(B +B′; q0).
If ν = µ, we must also have ν′ = µ and the statement holds
by previous reasoning.
In the remainder, we only analyze the case ν  ν′ ≺
µ. This means that ν ∈ (im `i)\{νi+1} and ν′ ∈
(im `j)\{νj+1} for i ≤ j. By Theorem 3.4, we therefore
must have q ∈ [q0 + K(Xi)] and q′ ∈ [q + K(Xj)]. By
anti-monotonicity of witness cones, K(Xj) ⊇ K(Xi) and
hence, q′ ∈ [q0 +K(Xj)], yielding q′ ∈ Qˆ(ν′; q0).
We now argue that the budgets add up. Let x ∈ Xj ⊆ Xi.
By Lemma 3.1, we obtain that q ∈ Qˆ(B; q0) for B =
−U(q, x; q0), and q′ ∈ Qˆ(B′; q) for B′ = −U(q′, x; q),
and finally q′ ∈ Qˆ(B¯; q0) for B¯ = −U(q′, x; q0). How-
ever, by path independence of the utility function
B¯ = −U(q′, x; q0) = −U(q′, x; q)−U(q, x; q0) = B′+B.
Part 3: L as the locus of all solutions. See Appendix H
of the full version for the proof that
Qˆ(q0) =
⋃
ν∈imL Qˆ(ν; q0) .
Part 3’: L as the locus of solutions starting at a mid-
point. Let ν ∈ imL and q ∈ Qˆ(ν; q0). Since Qˆ(ν; q0) ⊆
p−1(ν) ∩ (q0 + X⊥ν ), Part 1’ (Appendix H of the full ver-
sion) yields that the solution path L′ for q coincides with
the portion of L starting at ν. Applying the proof of Part 3
to L′, we obtain
Qˆ(q) =
⋃
ν′∈imL:ν′ν Qˆ(ν
′; q) .
Part 4: Proof of the theorem. Let B,B′ ≥ 0 and q ∈
Qˆ(B; q0) and q′ ∈ Qˆ(B′; q). From Parts 3 and 3’, we know
that q ∈ Qˆ(ν; q0) and q′ ∈ Qˆ(ν′; q) for some ν, ν′ ∈ imL
such that ν  ν′. By Part 2, we therefore obtain that q′ ∈
Qˆ(B +B′; q0), proving the theorem.
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A EXAMPLES OF COST FUNCTIONS
Example A.1 (Quadratic cost). The first example of a cost
function, applicable to arbitrary outcome sets Ω, is the
quadratic cost function defined by C(q) = 12‖q‖2. In this
case, p(q) = q, and U(q′, µ; q) = 12‖q−µ‖2− 12‖q′−µ‖2.
It is clear that the expected utility is maximized when
p(q′) = q′ = µ.
Convex conjugate and Bregman divergence: C∗(ν) =
1
2‖ν‖2 and D(q, ν) = 12‖q − ν‖2, i.e., the Bregman diver-
gence is a monotone transformation of the Euclidean dis-
tance.
Example A.2 (LMSR). Our second example is Hanson’s
logarithmic market-scoring rule (LMSR) [12, 13], which is
applied to complete markets whose outcomes coincide with
basis vectors, i.e., Ω = {ei : i ∈ [n]} where ei denotes the
i-th basis vector and [n] denotes the set {1, . . . , n}. In this
case M is the simplex in Rn and beliefs µ are in one-to-
one correspondence with probability distributions over Ω.
The LMSR cost function is
C(q) = ln
(∑n
i=1 e
q[i]
)
where q[i] denotes the i-th coordinate of q. The price vector
is
p(q)[i] =
∂C(q)
∂q[i]
=
eq[i]∑n
j=1 e
q[j]
= eq[i]−C(q) .
For µ ∈M, the expected utility function takes form
U(q′, µ; q) =
n∑
i=1
µ[i]
(
ln p(q′)[i]− ln p(q)[i]
)
= KL(µ‖p(q))− KL(µ‖p(q′)) ,
where KL(µ‖ν) = ∑ni=1 µ[i] ln(µ[i]/ν[i]) is the KL-
divergence. KL-divergence is not symmetric, but it is non-
negative, and zero only if the arguments are equal. Thus,
the expected utility is clearly maximized if and only if
µ = p(q′).
Convex conjugate and Bregman divergence: C∗(ν) = ∞
if ν is not a probability measure on Ω, and C∗(ν) =∑n
i=1 ν[i] ln ν[i] otherwise, with the convention 0 ln 0 = 0.
The Bregman divergence is D(q, ν) = KL(ν‖p(q)).
Example A.3 (Log-partition cost). Next example is the
log-partition function, which is applicable to arbitrary out-
come sets Ω and which generalizes LMSR:
C(q) = ln
(∑
ω∈Ω e
q·ω) .
Let Pq be the probability measure over Ω defined by
Pq(ω) = e
q·ω−C(q) .
The prices then correspond to expected values of ω under
Pq:
p(q) =
∑
ω∈Ω
Pq(ω)ω .
For µ ∈M, let Pµ denote the distribution of maximum en-
tropy among P with EP [ω] = µ (this distribution is unique
and always exists). Note that we are overloading notation
on Pq and Pν and use the “type” of the subscript to indi-
cate which probability distribution we have in mind. The
expected utility function can be written as
U(q′, µ; q) = (q′ − q) · E
ω∼Pµ
[ω]− C(q′) + C(q)
= E
ω∼Pµ
[lnPq′(ω)− lnPq(ω)]
= E
ω∼Pµ
[
ln
(
Pµ(ω)
Pq(ω)
)
− ln
(
Pµ(ω)
Pq′(ω)
)]
= KL(Pµ‖Pq)− KL(Pµ‖Pq′) .
A standard duality result shows that the infimum of
KL(Pµ‖Pq′) over the set {Pq′ : q′ ∈ Rn} is zero.
If there exists q′ attaining this minimum, we must have
Pµ = Pq′ and thus µ = p(q′). We argue that the con-
verse is true as well. Let q′, q′′ be such that Pq′ = Pµ and
p(q′) = p(q′′) = µ. Then by convexity of C, we have
C(q′′)− C(q′) = (q′′ − q′) · p(q′). Therefore,
KL(Pq′‖Pq′′) = (q′ − q′′) · p(q′)− C(q′) + C(q′′) = 0 ,
i.e., Pq′ = Pq′′ = Pµ. Hence, for any q ∈ Rn, Pq is
exactly the distribution of maximum entropy among those
P that satisfy EP [ω] = p(q). In other words, Pp(q) = Pq .
Convex conjugate and Bregman divergence: C∗(ν) = ∞
if there is no distribution P on Ω such that EP [ω] = ν, and
C∗(ν) =
∑
ω∈Ω Pν(ω) lnPν(ω) otherwise. The Bregman
divergence D(q, ν) = KL(Pν‖Pq) = KL(Pν‖Pp(q)).
B PROOF OF THEOREM 2.2
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Throughout this proof we use con-
cepts of convex conjugacy and Bregman divergence intro-
duced in Section 4. LetB ≥ 0 and B := {q : U(q, ω; q0) ≥
−B for all ω ∈ Ω} be the set of states satisfying the con-
straints of Convex Program (2.1). Using the definition of
utility function, we can rewrite Convex Program (2.1) as
max
q∈Rn
[(q − q0) · µ− C(q) + C(q0)− IB(q)] (B.1)
where IB(·) is the convex indicator function, equal to 0 on
the set B and ∞ outside it. Since the cost function C is
convex on Rn, and B is closed, convex and non-empty,
Fenchel’s Duality Theorem [18, Theorem 31.1] implies
that the supremum of the above objective equals the fol-
lowing minimum
min
ν∈Rn
[C∗(ν)− q0 · µ+ C(q0) + I∗B(µ− ν)] (B.2)
and this minimum is attained at some νˆ ∈ Rn. Now, let
qˆ ∈ Qˆ(B; q0) be a solution of Eq. (B.1). By Fenchel’s
Duality, the gap between the objectives of Eq. (B.2) and
Eq. (B.1) at νˆ and qˆ must be zero:
0 = C∗(νˆ)− q0 · µ+ C(q0) + I∗B(µ− νˆ)
− (qˆ − q0) · µ+ C(qˆ)− C(q0) + IB(qˆ)
= C∗(νˆ)− qˆ · νˆ + C(qˆ) + I∗B(µ− νˆ)− qˆ · (µ− νˆ)
+ IB(qˆ)
= D(qˆ, νˆ) +
[
I∗B(µ− νˆ)−
(
qˆ · (µ− νˆ)− IB(qˆ)
)]
.
The term in the brackets is non-negative from the defini-
tion of the convex conjugate. Since D(qˆ, νˆ) is also non-
negative, we obtain that it must be zero, i.e., p(qˆ) = νˆ.
Since this reasoning is independent of the choice qˆ ∈
Qˆ(B; q0), the theorem follows.
C OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS AND
THE MINIMAL FACE
This appendix discusses arbitrage-free initialization, pro-
vides proofs of optimality conditions (Lemma 3.1 and The-
orem 3.4), and shows that minimal faces are well defined.
C.1 Arbitrage-free initialization
Throughout the paper we assume that the initial state q0
is arbitrage-free in the sense that a trader with no budget
prefers to stay in q0:
Definition C.1. We say that the initial state q0 is arbitrage-
free with respect to µ ∈ M if q0 is an optimal state at
budget zero, i.e., q0 ∈ Qˆ(0; q0).
This corresponds to the assumption that a trader cannot ex-
tract a positive expected profit without risking some capital.
Below we show that the condition is easily ensured for both
the log-partition and quadratic cost.
The assumption of arbitrage-free initialization was added
after the paper was published in the Proceedings of the
31st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence,
2015. For the sake of consistency with the published ver-
sion, we have only made corrections in Appendix. Without
arbitrage-free initialization, Lemma 3.1 and its corollaries
fail to hold forB = 0. The main text requires the following
four corrections:
Lemma 3.1: Let q0 be arbitrage-free. Then q ∈ Qˆ(B; q0)
if and only if . . .
Theorem 3.4: Let q0 be arbitrage-free. Then q ∈ Qˆ(q0) if
and only if . . .
Corollary 3.5: Let q0 be arbitrage-free. Then Qˆ(ν; q0) =
p−1(ν) ∩ [q0 +K(Xν)]. In particular, . . .
Definition 3.7: . . . if for all beliefs µ ∈ M′ and all
arbitrage-free initial states q0 ∈ p−1(M′) . . .
Below we show that regardless of q0, any q ∈ Qˆ(q0) is
arbitrage-free. This property is useful in proving our main
result (Theorem 5.2). We also derive necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for arbitrage-free initialization. In par-
ticular, we show that any q0 is arbitrage-free for the log-
partition cost, and any q0 with p(q0) ∈M is arbitrage-free
for the quadratic cost.
Proposition C.2. Any q ∈ Qˆ(q0) is arbitrage-free for any
q0 ∈ Rn.
Proof. Let q ∈ Qˆ(B; q0) for some B ≥ 0 and let q′ ∈
Qˆ(0; q). We will use path independence to show that also
q ∈ Qˆ(0; q). To begin, note that the budget constraints
satisfied by q and q′ are
U(q, ω; q0) ≥ −B for all ω ∈ Ω,
U(q′, ω; q) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
By path independence, we therefore have, for all ω ∈ Ω,
U(q′, ω; q0) = U(q′, ω; q) + U(q, ω; q0) ≥ −B ,
so q′ satisfies the budget constraints forB at the initial state
q0. Since q is optimal for the budget B and the initial state
q0, we must have
U(q′, µ; q0) ≤ U(q, µ; q0) .
Path independence then gives
U(q′, µ; q) = U(q′, µ; q0)−U(q, µ; q0) ≤ 0 = U(q, µ; q) .
Since q′ ∈ Qˆ(0; q) and q is a feasible action for the budget
zero and the initial state q, we must have U(q′, µ; q) = 0 =
U(q, µ; q) and thus q ∈ Qˆ(0; q).
Proposition C.3. If q0 is arbitrage-free then p(q0) ∈M.
Proof. For a contradiction, assume p(q0) 6∈ M. We will
show that there exists a state q′ such that U(q′, ν; q0) ≥ ε
for all ν ∈ M and some ε > 0. This will imply that the
budget constraints for B = 0 are satisfied for q′ and also
that U(q′, µ; q0) ≥ ε. This contradicts the optimality of q0
because U(q0, µ; q0) = 0.
To proceed, consider the optimization
sup
q∈Rn
min
ν∈M
U(q, ν; q0)
= min
ν∈M
sup
q∈Rn
U(q, ν; q0) (C.1)
= min
ν∈M
sup
q∈Rn
[q · ν − q0 · ν − C(q) + C(q0)]
= min
ν∈M
[C∗(ν)− q0 · ν + C(q0)] (C.2)
= min
ν∈M
D(q0, ν) (C.3)
= D(q0, νˆ) (C.4)
where we use Sion’s minimax theorem in Eq. (C.1), the
definition of conjugate in Eq. (C.2), and denote the min-
imizer of Eq. (C.3) as νˆ in Eq. (C.4). By assumption,
p(q0) 6∈ M and thus p(q0) 6= νˆ. This implies that
D(q0, νˆ) > 0, so the value of the initial supremum is
greater than zero. Therefore, there must exist q′ such that
minν∈M U(q′, ν; q0) =: ε > 0, yielding the desired con-
tradiction.
While p(q0) ∈ M is a necessary condition for arbitrage-
free initialization, it is not sufficient. For example, con-
sider n = 1, M = [0, 1], and the cost function C(q) =
max{0, q2/2}. Here, q0 = −1 is not arbitrage-free for any
µ ∈ (0, 1], even though p(q0) = 0 ∈ M. We next present
a technical lemma followed by two sufficient conditions.
Lemma C.4. Let q0 be such that p(q0) ∈ M and let
q ∈ Qˆ(0; q0). Then p(q) = p(q0), and for any decom-
position of p(q0) into a convex combination over ω, i.e.,
for any weights cω ≥ 0 such that p(q0) =
∑
ω∈Ω cωω and∑
ω∈Ω cω = 1, we have cωU(q, ω; q0) = 0 for all ω.
Proof. Budget constraints on q ∈ Qˆ(0; q0) imply that
U(q, ω; q0) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. (C.5)
For a given set of weights cω write
0 ≤
∑
ω
cωU(q, ω; q0) = U
(
q,
∑
ω cωω; q0
)
(C.6)
= U(q, p(q0); q0)
= q · p(q0)− q0 · p(q0)− C(q) + C(q0)
= q · p(q0)− C∗
(
p(q0)
)− C(q)
= −D(q, p(q0)) .
Since Bregman divergence is non-negative, we obtain that
D(q, p(q0)) = 0 and thus p(q) = p(q0). From Eq. (C.6),
we then also obtain that each of the terms cωU(q, ω; q0)
must equal zero, because cω ≥ 0 and utilities are non-
negative by Eq. (C.5).
Proposition C.5. The state q0 is arbitrage-free if either of
the following conditions holds:
(a) p(q0) ∈ riM;
(b) p(q0) ∈M and C is strictly convex.
Proof.
Part (a). Let q ∈ Qˆ(0; q0). It suffices to show that
U(q, µ; q0) ≤ U(q0, µ; q0) = 0. To begin, note that since
p(q0) ∈ riM, we can write p(q0) as a positive convex
combination of ω ∈ Ω, i.e., p(q0) =
∑
ω∈Ω cωω where
cω > 0 and
∑
ω∈Ω cω = 1. By Lemma C.4, we obtain that
cωU(q, ω; q0) = 0 for all ω and hence U(q, ω; q0) = 0 for
all ω. Since µ is a convex combination of ω, the linearity
of utility in the second argument yields U(q, µ; q0) = 0.
Part (b). We again appeal to Lemma C.4. Let q ∈
Qˆ(0; q0). Then by Lemma C.4, we have that p(q) = p(q0),
and the strict convexity of C yields q = q0.
Part (a) implies that every q0 ∈ Rn is arbitrage-free for the
log-partition cost. Part (b) implies that every q0 such that
p(q0) ∈M is arbitrage-free for the quadratic cost.
C.2 Proofs of Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.4
Proof of Lemma 3.1. We prove the revised version of the
lemma with the additional assumption that q0 is arbitrage-
free (see Appendix C.1). First consider B = 0 and assume
q ∈ Qˆ(B; q0). Since q0 is arbitrage-free, we have p(q0) ∈
M, so it can be written as a convex combination of ω ∈ Ω,
say p(q0) =
∑
ω cωω. By Lemma C.4 we therefore obtain
that each of the terms cωU(q, ω; q0) must equal zero. Thus,
whenever cω > 0, we necessarily have U(q, ω; q0) = 0.
Let S := {ω ∈ Ω : cω > 0}. Note that for any x, x′ ∈ S
we have (q−q0)·(x′−x) = U(q, x′; q0)−U(q, x; q0) = 0.
Since S is non-empty, we can pick an arbitrary s ∈ S and
define X := {ω ∈ Ω : (q − q0) · (ω − s) = 0}. We next
argue thatX satisfies conditions (a)–(d) and then show that
it is actually a face. Conditions (a) and (d) follow from the
definition ofX and the fact that U(q, s; q0) = 0. Condition
(b) follows because q satisfies budget constraints for B =
0. Finally, condition (c) follows because S ⊆ X . To see
that X is a face, note that condition (b) actually shows that
X is exactly the set of minimizers of the linear function
(q − q0) · ω over ω ∈ Ω.
Now, consider B > 0. We begin by forming a Lagrangian
of Convex Program (2.1), with non-negative multipliers
λ = (λω)ω∈Ω:
L(q, λ) = U(q, µ; q0) +
∑
ω
λω (U(q, ω; q0) +B) .
Since the utilities are convex and finite over q ∈ Rn, and
q0 is feasible with all of the constraints satisfied with strict
inequalities, KKT conditions are both necessary and suffi-
cient for optimality [18, Corollary 28.3.1]. KKT conditions
state that q and λ solve the above problem if and only if the
following hold:
• primal feasibility: U(q, ω; q0) ≥ −B for all ω ∈ Ω;
• dual feasibility: λ ≥ 0;
• first-order optimality: ∇1L(q, λ) = 0;
• complementary slackness: λω (U(q, ω; q0) +B) = 0;
for all ω ∈ Ω.
We next show that KKT conditions imply (a)–(d). Assume
that KKT conditions hold. Let X be the set of outcomes
with tight constraints, i.e., X = {x ∈ Ω : U(q, x; q0) =
−B}. For this X , the conditions (a) and (b) hold by primal
feasibility and our definition ofX . Note that we have either
X = ∅ or X = argminx∈Ω(q − q0) · x, i.e., X is a face of
M. If X 6= ∅, then (d) follows from our definition of X . If
X = ∅, then (d) follows by primal feasibility. We prove (c)
by analyzing first-order optimality. First note that:
∇1U(q, ν; q0) = ν −∇C(q) = ν − p(q) .
Thus, first-order optimality is equivalent to
∇1U(q, µ; q0) +
∑
ω
λω∇1U(q, ω; q0) = 0
µ− p(q) +
∑
ω
λω(ω − p(q)) = 0
p(q) =
µ+
∑
ω λωω
1 +
∑
ω λω
.
By complementary slackness, λω = 0 for ω ∈ Ω\X , so
this shows (c).
For the converse, assume that (a)–(d) hold. In particular,
by (c), let p(q) = cµµ +
∑
ω∈X cωω where cµ, cω ≥ 0
and cµ +
∑
ω∈X cω = 1. If cµ > 0, then we obtain that
KKT conditions hold for the given q and λω = cω/cµ for
ω ∈ X and λω = 0 for ω ∈ Ω\X . Since KKT conditions
are sufficient for optimality [18, Theorem 28.3], we obtain
q ∈ Qˆ(B; q0).
If cµ = 0, we actually have p(q) ∈ conv(X) and X 6= ∅.
Thus, from (a) and (d),
B =
∑
ω∈X
cω [−U(q, ω; q0)] = −U
(
q,
∑
ω∈X cωω; q0
)
= −U(q, p(q); q0) (C.7)
= −q · p(q) + q0 · p(q) + C(q)− C(q0) (C.8)
= −C∗(p(q))+ q0 · p(q)− C(q0) (C.9)
= −D(q0, p(q)) . (C.10)
By non-negativity of Bregman divergence, Eq. (C.10) can
only hold if B = 0 and p(q0) = p(q). Feasibility of q fol-
lows by (d) and (b). To see that q is also optimal, first note
that U(q, ω; q0) ≥ 0 for all ω. Since µ is a convex com-
bination of ω, the linearity of U in the second argument
implies U(q, µ; q0) ≥ 0. However, by arbitrage-free ini-
tialization, q0 is optimal and U(q0, µ; q0) = 0, so we must
have U(q, µ; q0) = 0 and q optimal as well.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. We prove the revised version of the
theorem with the additional assumption that q0 is arbitrage-
free (see Appendix C.1). If q ∈ [q0 + K(Xp(q)) then we
have q ∈ Qˆ(q0) by Lemma 3.1 with X = Xp(q). For the
converse, assume that q ∈ Qˆ(q0). Lemma 3.1 then implies
that there exists a face X such that q ∈ [q0 + K(X)] and
p(q) ∈ conv(X ∪ {µ}). By minimality of Xp(q), we must
have Xp(q) ⊆ X . By anti-monotonicity of witness cones,
we then have q ∈ [q0 +K(Xp(q))], finishing the proof.
C.3 Minimal face
Proposition C.6. Fix µ ∈ M. Then for any ν ∈ M, there
exists the minimal face Xν with the following property: for
any face X such that ν ∈ conv(X ∪ {µ}), we must have
Xν ⊆ X .
Proof. If ν = µ then Xν = ∅ and the statement holds.
Otherwise, consider the ray ρ from µ towards ν, and let ν′
be the last point on the ray that is contained inM. Let Xν
be the unique face such that ν′ lies in the relative interior
of conv(Xν).8 We will argue that this face satisfies the
condition stated in the proposition. Let X be any face such
that ν ∈ conv(X ∪ {µ}). Then ν = λµ + (1 − λ)νX for
νX ∈ conv(X) and λ ∈ [0, 1). Since νX ∈ M, it must lie
on the ray ρ at some point between ν and ν′. We next argue
than ν′ ∈ conv(X). Suppose not, this means that ν′ 6= νX ,
and νX maximizes some linear function, say u · ν¯, over
ν¯ ∈M, and u · ν′ < u · νX , i.e.,
u · (νX − ν′) > 0 .
Since ν 6= µ and ν′ 6= νX , and the points µ, ν, νX , ν′ lie
on the ray ρ (in that order), there exists η > 0 such that
µ− νX = η(νX − ν′) and thus
u · (µ− νX) = ηu · (νX − ν′) > 0
implying that u · µ > u · νX and contradicting the assump-
tion that νX is the maximizer. Thus, ν′ ∈ conv(X). By a
similar reasoning, we can also show that for any x ∈ Xν ,
we must have x ∈ X . Again, for the sake of contradic-
tion assume that there is u such that ν′ is a maximizer
of u · ν¯ over ν¯ ∈ M, but x is not. Then x 6= ν′, and
since ν′ ∈ ri conv(Xν), for sufficiently small η, we have
ν′′ := ν′+η(ν′−x) ∈M, and u ·ν′′ > u ·ν′ contradicting
the maximizer property of ν′. Thus, Xν ⊆ X .
D IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT OF
FORTNOW AND SAMI
We can use the KKT lemma (Lemma 3.1) and the conti-
nuity of the perpendiculars (Theorem F.3) to derive the im-
possibility result of Fortnow and Sami [8]. The result states
that in the presence of budget constraints, there is no mar-
ket scoring rule guaranteeing that the market prices move
towards the agent belief along the connecting straight line
(unless aff(M) is a line or a point).
Our construction is based on the observation that according
to the KKT lemma, the solutions q must lie on a perpendic-
ular at q0, and the continuity of the perpendiculars implies
that p(q) is arbitrarily close to p(q0) for a small enough
budget. In particular, if p(q0) lies in the relative interior of
conv(Xp(q0) ∪ {µ}) then we can assure that so does p(q),
and this property does not change with small perturbations
8The existence of such a unique face follows by the standard
result stating that relative interiors of conv(X) across non-empty
facesX form a disjoint partition ofM.
of µ—in particular, q remains a solution to the budget con-
strained optimization. Thus, the direction of movement of
market prices is independent of small changes in µ.
This informal reasoning can be turned into the following
formal argument. Assume the dimension of aff(M) is
d ≥ 2. Choose µ ∈ riM and a face X such that aff(X) is
of dimension d − 1, so conv(X ∪ {µ}) is of dimension d.
Pick q0 such that p(q0) lies in ri conv(X ∪{µ}), which as-
sures that X is the minimal face for p(q0). Let ν0 denote
p(q0). Consider the µ-perpendicular to X at q0. By conti-
nuity of perpendiculars, we can pick a point ν  ν0 on the
perpendicular which is arbitrarily close to ν0 and, in par-
ticular, which still lies in ri conv(X ∪ {µ}), so its minimal
face is stillX . Pick q ∈ q0+X⊥ such that p(q) = ν, which
is possible by Proposition 4.2. We next show that actually
q ∈ q0 +K(X), which implies that q is a solution to budget
constrained optimization (by Theorem 3.4).
Let u be the normal to aff(X) within aff(M) such thatM
lies in the non-negative half-space, i.e., all ν′ ∈ M can be
expressed in the form ν′ = a′+ t′u where a′ ∈ aff(X) and
t′ ≥ 0. Thus, we can write
ν0 = a0 + t0u ,
ν = aν + tνu ,
ω = aω + tωu for all ω ∈ Ω ,
for some a0, aν , aω ∈ aff(X) and t0, tν , tω ≥ 0. By con-
vexity
0 ≤ (q − q0) · (ν − ν0)
= (q − q0) · [aν − a0 + (tν − t0)u]
= (q − q0) · (tν − t0)u (D.1)
where Eq. (D.1) follows because (q− q0) ⊥ aff(X). Since
ν  ν0 along the perpendicular, we have that tν > t0 and
so Eq. (D.1) implies
0 ≤ (q − q0) · u .
Thus, for any ω ∈ Ω and x ∈ X ,
(q − q0) · (ω − x) = (q − q0) · (aω − x+ tωu)
= tω(q − q0) · u
≥ 0 ,
showing that q ∈ q0 +K(X), i.e., q ∈ Qˆ(q0). If ν0, ν and µ
are not on a straight line, we are done. Otherwise, slightly
move µ within the affine space parallel to aff(X), so that
X remains the minimal face for ν and thus q remains a
solution, but ν0, ν and µ are no longer on a straight line.
E BUDGET ADDITIVITY: EXAMPLES
Using the KKT lemma, we illustrate on examples that bud-
get additivity sometimes holds and sometimes does not.
Recall that budget additivity states that if several agents
have the same belief and limited budgets, the sequence of
their actions is equivalent to the action of a single agent
with the same belief and the sum of the budgets. In the
first example, we give an illustration of when this property
holds. In the second example, we show how this property
can be violated, and the single agent with the sum of bud-
gets has more power in the market.
Example E.1 (Quadratic cost on a square). Consider the
following outcome space and belief:
ω00 = (0, 0)
ω01 = (0, 1)
ω10 = (1, 0)
ω11 = (1, 1)
µ = (0.9, 0.3)
Further, consider the following market states:
q0 = ν0 = (0.5, 0.1)
q1 = ν1 = (0.6, 0.2) =
1
3ω00 +
2
3µ
qµ = µ
The divergence of these states (and the belief µ) from indi-
vidual outcomes is:
1
2‖· − ·‖2 ω00 ω01 ω10 ω11
ν0 0.13 0.53 0.13 0.53
ν1 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4
µ 0.45 0.65 0.05 0.25
With these in hand, we can now use the KKT lemma and
show that q1 = ν1 is an optimal action at q0 = ν0 under
belief µ for a specific budget. Since q1 is a convex com-
bination of ω00 and µ, we need to show that the only tight
budget constraint is due to ω00. We also calculate budgets
required to move from q0 and q1 to qµ:
ω00 ω01 ω10 ω11
U(q1, ·; q0) −0.07 0.03 0.03 0.13 B01 = 0.07
U(qµ, ·; q0) −0.32 −0.12 0.08 0.28 B0µ = 0.32
U(qµ, ·; q1) −0.25 −0.15 0.05 0.15 B1µ = 0.25
Hence, a sequence of moves with budgets B01 and B1µ
is equivalent to a single move with the budget B0µ =
B01 + B1µ. While we have shown this only for a specific
sequence of budgets, results of Section 5 show that for the
quadratic cost on a square, budget additivity holds for any
sequence of budgets and any belief µ ∈M.
Example E.2 (Quadratic cost on an obtuse triangle.). Now,
we work out an example where the budget additivity does
not hold. Consider the following outcome space and belief:
ω1 = (0.0, 0.0)
ω2 = (1.8, 0.0)
ω3 = (6.0, 4.2)
µ= (2.7, 1.8)
Further, consider the following set of market states:
q0 = ν0 = (2.7, 0.9)
q1 = ν1 = (2.4, 1.2) =
1
3ω2 +
2
3µ
q2 = ν2 = (2.4, 1.6) =
1
9ω1 +
8
9µ
q3 = ν3 =
(
0.9
√
105
13 , 0.6
√
105
13
)
=
(
1− 13
√
105
13
)
ω1 +
(
1
3
√
105
13
)
µ ≈ 119ω1 + 1819µ
qµ = µ
The divergence of these states (and the belief µ) from indi-
vidual outcomes is:
1
2‖· − ·‖2 ω1 ω2 ω3
ν0 4.05 0.81 10.89
ν1 3.6 0.9 10.98
ν2 4.16 1.46 9.86
ν3 4.725 1.74 . . . 9.04 . . .
µ 5.265 2.025 8.325
Again as before, we can use the KKT lemma and show for
j = 1, 2, 3, that qj = νj is an optimal action at qj−1 =
νj−1 under belief µ, with the corresponding budgets as:
ω1 ω2 ω3
U(q1, ·; q0) 0.45 −0.09 −0.09 B01 = 0.09
U(q2, ·; q1) −0.56 −0.56 1.12 B12 = 0.56
U(q3, ·; q2) −0.565 −0.28 . . . 0.82 . . . B23 = 0.565
U(qµ, ·; q0) −1.215 −1.215 2.565 B0µ = 1.215
The above table also shows that the budget B0µ = 1.215
suffices to move directly from q0 to qµ. However, note that
the sum
B01 +B12 +B23 = 1.215 = B0µ ,
but ν3 6= µ, i.e., after the sequence of optimal actions with
budgets B01, B12, and B23, the market is still not at the
belief shared by all agents, even though with the budget
B0µ, it would have reached it. Note that it is possible to
achieve budget additivity by using log-partition cost instead
of quadratic cost (Theorem 5.6).
F PERPENDICULARS
F.1 Proofs of Propositions 4.2 and 4.3
Proof of Proposition 4.2. We will show that condition (i)
is equivalent to condition (ii) by analyzing the first order
optimality conditions. Consider the problem
min
ν′∈Aλ
D(q, ν′) (F.1)
used to define νλ. Assume that the minimum is attained at
some ν′ ∈ ri domC∗. Thus, ν′ ∈ A ∩ (ri domC∗). Since
D(q, ν′) is subdifferentiable at ν′, the first order optimality
implies that (
∂2D(q, ν
′)
) ∩A⊥λ 6= ∅ . (F.2)
Since ∂2D(q, ν′) = ∂C∗(ν′)−q = p−1(ν′)−q, andA⊥λ =
A⊥0 , we have
p−1(ν′) ∩ (q +A⊥0 ) 6= ∅ ,
proving that (i)⇒(ii). Conversely, assume that ν′ ∈ A ∩
(ri domC∗) and p−1(ν′) ∩ (q + A⊥0 ) 6= ∅. Then we can
pick λ such that ν′ ∈ Aλ, and for this λ, we obtain that
condition (F.2) holds and hence ν′ solves problem (F.1).
Since ν′ ∈ ri domC∗, we obtain that ν′ ∈ im γ.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Let γ′ be the a1-perpendicular to
A0 at q′. Since the ambient space A for both perpendicu-
lars is the same, by Proposition 4.2(ii), it suffices to show
that q + A⊥0 = q
′ + A⊥0 . However, this follows by the
assumption of the theorem, since q′ − q ∈ A⊥0 .
F.2 Continuity of perpendiculars
In this section, we prove two important properties of per-
pendiculars: (a) they are continuous maps; (b) intersections
of perpendiculars with compact convex sets correspond to
compact sets of market states up to certain “irrelevant dis-
placements”. To define these irrelevant displacements, let
L be the linear space parallel to aff(domC∗). Then the dis-
placements of market state within L⊥ are irrelevant in the
sense that they have no effect on the Bregman divergence
and hence by Eq. (4.1) also no effect on the utility func-
tion. Specifically, D(q + u, ν) = D(q, ν) for all u ∈ L⊥
(see next proposition). For instance, for LMSR over a sim-
plex, the irrelevant displacements are of the form λ~1 where
λ ∈ R and ~1 is the all-ones vector.
Proposition F.1. Let L be the linear space parallel to
aff(domC∗). Then for all q ∈ Rn and u ∈ L⊥
D(q + u, ν) = D(q, ν) .
Proof. If ν 6∈ domC∗ then the statement obviously holds.
Pick ν ∈ domC∗, q ∈ Rn and u ∈ L⊥. By the Mean
Value Theorem, we can write
C(q + u)− C(q) = u · ∇C(q¯)
for some q¯. Let ν¯ := ∇C(q¯) ∈ domC∗. Then we can
write
D(q + u, ν)−D(q, ν)
= C(q + u)− C(q)− u · ν = u · (ν¯ − ν) = 0
since u ⊥ (ν¯ − ν).
The following result of Rockafellar [18] will be instrumen-
tal in proving continuity properties of the perpendicular. It
is paraphrased for our setting. The notation int refers to the
topological interior of the set.
Theorem F.2 (Theorem 24.7 of Rockafellar [18]). Let
G : Rn → (−∞,∞] be a lower semi-continuous convex
function, and let K be a non-empty, closed and bounded
subset of int(domG). Then the set
∂G(K) =
⋃
u∈K
∂G(u)
is non-empty, closed and bounded.
Now we are ready to state and prove the continuity of per-
pendiculars:
Theorem F.3. Let γ be the a1-perpendicular to A0 at q,
and K ⊆ ri domC∗ be a closed bounded convex set inter-
secting im γ.
(a) The map γ is continuous and Λ is open.
(b) The intersection M := {(ν, q) : ν ∈ (im γ) ∩K, q ∈
p−1(ν)} can be written as M = C + (0⊕L⊥) where
C is compact and ⊕ denotes a direct sum of vector
spaces.
Proof. Throughout the proof, let F (ν) := D(q, ν) =
C(q) + C∗(ν) − q · ν. Note that F is strictly convex
on ri domC∗. We will be also making frequent use of
the fact that F is continuous on ri domC∗ (because C∗
is continuous on ri domC∗ by Theorem 10.1 of Rockafel-
lar [18]). Let ‖·‖ denote the usual Euclidean norm. Let
a0 = argmina∈A0‖a1 − a‖, i.e., (a1 − a0) ∈ A⊥0 . Let
A = aff(A0 ∪ {a1}) and recall that
Aλ = A0 + λ(a1 − a0)
and
νλ = argmin
Aλ
F (ν) .
We use the notation B(ν, r;M) := {ν′ ∈ M : ‖ν′ −
ν‖ ≤ r} for the Euclidean ball relative to set M , and
S(ν, r;M) := {ν′ ∈M : ‖ν′− ν‖ = r} for the Euclidean
sphere relative to set M .
Part (a). We need to show that γ is continuous. Let
λ ∈ Λ, i.e., νλ ∈ ri domC∗. Choose a sufficiently small
r > 0 such that the ball B := B(νλ, r;A) is contained in
ri domC∗. To show the continuity of γ and openness of
Λ, it suffices to show that if λ′ is close enough to λ then
νλ′ ∈ B.
Let ε = r/
√
2. Consider the sphere Sλ := S(νλ, ε;Aλ) ⊆
ri domC∗. This sphere is a compact set, so F attains the
minimum on Sλ. By strict convexity of F and the opti-
mality of νλ, this minimum must be bounded away from
F (νλ). Thus, there exists δ > 0 such that
F (ν) ≥ F (νλ) + δ for all ν ∈ Sλ . (F.3)
Let δ′ = δ/3. Since F is continuous on ri domC∗, it is
uniformly continuous on B and thus there exists ε′ ∈ (0, ε]
such that
|F (ν′)− F (ν)| ≤ δ′
for all ν, ν′ ∈ B such that ‖ν′ − ν‖ ≤ ε′. (F.4)
Let Bλ := B(νλ, ε;Aλ) be the closed ball with Sλ as the
border. For any λ′, let Sλ′ := Sλ+(λ′−λ)(a1−a0) ⊆ Aλ′
and similarly Bλ′ . Let ν˜λ′ = νλ+(λ′−λ)(a1−a0) ∈ Aλ′ .
Note that if |λ′ − λ| ≤ ε′, then Bλ′ ⊆ B, because√
(λ′ − λ)2 + ε2 ≤ ε√2 = r. So we can use the above
uniform continuity result and write:
• F (ν′) ≥ F (νλ)+δ−δ′ = F (νλ)+2δ′ for all ν′ ∈ Sλ′
by Eqs. (F.3) and (F.4)
• F (ν˜λ′) ≤ F (νλ) + δ′ by Eq. (F.4)
By convexity of F , this means that νλ′ ∈ Bλ′ . This proves
that νλ′ ∈ B provided that |λ′ − λ| ≤ ε′, thus proving the
continuity of γ at λ.
Part (b). We first show that the set M is closed and then
that it is bounded, except for directions in 0 ⊕ L⊥. Since
K ⊆ ri domC∗, we can use Proposition 4.2 to write the
set M as
M = {(ν′, q′) : ν′ ∈ Rn, q′ ∈ ∂C∗(ν′)}
∩ (Rn × (q +A⊥0 )) ∩ (K × Rn) , (F.5)
where we used the identity p−1(ν′) = ∂C∗(ν′) valid for
all ν′. The closedness follows, because the set of pairs
{(ν′, q′) : ν′ ∈ Rn, q′ ∈ ∂C∗(ν′)} is closed [18, The-
orem 24.4].
Denote the projections of M on its two components as
M1 := {ν′ : (ν′, q′) ∈M for some q′} ,
M2 := {q′ : (ν′, q′) ∈M for some ν′} .
To show boundedness, we only need to analyze M2 since
M1 ⊆ K. By Eq. (F.5), it in fact suffices to show that the
set ∂C∗(K) =
⋃
ν∈K ∂C
∗(ν) is bounded except for direc-
tions in L⊥. We would like to appeal to Theorem F.2, but
we cannot do it directly, because it is stated for the interior
rather than the relative interior. For ν ∈ ri domC∗, we
have ∂C∗(ν) 6= ∅, and using the fact that C∗(ν) =∞ over
ν + (L⊥\{0}), we obtain that
∂C∗(ν) = S + L⊥
for some set S ⊆ L. This set S coincides with subd-
ifferential when C∗(ν) is only viewed as a function over
aff(domC∗). By applying Theorem F.2 to this restriction,
we then indeed obtain that
∂C∗(K) = C + L⊥
for a non-empty closed and bounded set C. Note that L⊥ ⊆
A⊥0 , so L⊥ survives taking the intersection in Eq. (F.5) and
hence part (b) of the theorem follows.
G PROOFS OF SUFFICIENT
CONDITIONS FOR ACUTE ANGLES
Proposition G.1. For the quadratic cost, Definition 5.1 is
equivalent to Definition 3.8.
Proof. We first show that Definition 5.1 (general acute an-
gles) implies Definition 3.8 (Euclidean acute angles). As-
sume that the general acute angles hold for X . Let ν¯ ∈ M
and ν be its projection on aff(X). If ν¯ = ν then angles
between ν¯, ν and ω ∈ Ω are non-obtuse in the sense that
(ν¯ − ν) · (ω − ν) ≥ 0. If ν¯ 6= ν, then let γ be the ν¯-
perpendicular to X at ν (note that p is the identity map, so
ν is both a state and the corresponding price vector). Note
that ν¯  ν and thus by the general acute angles assumption
p−1(ν¯) ∩ [ν + K(X)] 6= ∅. Since p−1(ν¯) = {ν¯}, this is
equivalent to
(ν¯ − ν) · (ω − x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X,ω ∈ Ω .
Since ν ∈ aff(X), we obtain that (ν¯ − ν) · (ω − ν) ≥ 0,
i.e., the Euclidean acute angles hold.
Conversely, assume that the Euclidean acute angles hold.
Let γ be a µ-perpendicular to a face X for some µ ∈ M
and ν′  ν be two points in im γ such that ν ∈ M. We
need to show that p−1(ν′) ∩ [ν + K(X)] 6= ∅, which is
equivalent to
(ν′ − ν) · (ω − x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X,ω ∈ Ω . (G.1)
If ν′ = ν then (G.1) holds. Otherwise, we can write ν′ =
ν + uX + λ(µ− νˆ) for an arbitrary νˆ ∈ aff(X), a suitable
λ > 0 and uX from the linear space parallel with aff(X).
Pick νˆ ∈ ri conv(X) (and the corresponding λ and uX ).
We claim that there is a small enough η > 0 such that
ν¯ := νˆ + η(ν′ − ν) ∈ M. This follows, because from our
previous reasoning,
ν¯ = νˆ + ηuX + ηλ(µ− νˆ),
and for sufficiently small η > 0, we have [νˆ+ηλ(µ− νˆ)] ∈
ri conv(X ∪ {µ}) and then also for sufficiently small η,
[νˆ + ηλ(µ− νˆ) + ηuX ] ∈ ri conv(X ∪ {µ}) ⊆M. Thus,
by the Euclidean acute angles,
(ν¯ − νˆ) · (ω − νˆ) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
Since ν¯ − νˆ = η(ν′ − ν) and (ν′ − ν) ⊥ (x − νˆ) for all
x ∈ X , we also obtain
η(ν′ − ν) · (ω − x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X,ω ∈ Ω
proving (G.1) and finishing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Let L be the linear space parallel to
aff(X). First show that the acute angles imply the inclusion
of the projection in an acute cone. Note that the inclusion is
either true for all a0 ∈ aff(X) or none, so we can without
loss of generality choose a0 ∈ conv(X). Let ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω
and let ω′1 and ω
′
2 be their projections to A
′, thus
ω′1 − ω1 ∈ L , ω′2 − ω2 ∈ L .
We need to show that
(ω′1 − a0) · (ω′2 − a0) ≥ 0 .
If ω1 ∈ aff(X) then ω′1 = a0 and the statement holds.
Assume that ω1 6∈ aff(X) and let γ be the ω1-perpendicular
to X at a0. Let ω′′1 ∈ im γ be the projection of ω1 on im γ.
Thus, we also have
ω′′1 − ω1 ∈ L
and also ω′′1  a0. Now by the acute angles assumption,
ω′′1 − a0 ∈ K(X), i.e., for any x ∈ X ,
0 ≤ (ω′′1 − a0) · (ω2 − x) .
Combining this with the previous identities, we obtain
0 ≤ (ω′′1 − a0) · (ω2 − x) = (ω′′1 − a0) · (ω′2 − a0)
= (ω′1 − a0) · (ω′2 − a0)
where the first equality follows because ω′′1 − a0 ∈ L⊥ and
ω′2 − ω2 ∈ L , a0 − x ∈ L ,
the second equality follows because ω′2 − a0 ∈ L⊥ and
ω′′1 − ω′1 = [(ω′′1 − ω1)− (ω′1 − ω1)] ∈ L .
For the converse, assume that the inclusion of the projec-
tion of M in an affine acute cone holds. Let γ be the µ-
perpendicular to X at ν for some µ, ν ∈M and let ν′  ν.
We need to show that ν′−ν ∈ K(X). Note that 0 ∈ K(X),
so we only analyze ν′ 6= ν. Let µ′ be the projection of µ on
im γ and a0 be the intersection of im γ with aff(X). Note
that ν′ − ν = η(µ′ − a0) for a suitable η > 0, so it suffices
to show that µ′ − a0 ∈ K(X). Pick ω ∈ Ω and x ∈ X and
let ω′ be the projection of ω into A′ := a0 + X⊥. Since
the projection ofM into A′ is contained in an affine acute
cone with the vertex a0, we obtain
(µ′ − a0) · (ω′ − a0) ≥ 0
Since ω′ −ω ∈ L and x− a0 ∈ L, whereas µ′ − a0 ∈ L⊥,
we obtain
(µ′ − a0) · (ω − x) ≥ 0
showing that the acute angles hold.
Proof of Corollary 5.4. We will show that the assumption
of Theorem 5.3 holds. Since the assumption is invariant
under rigid transformations, we can just consider the case
a0 = 0 ∈ X . In this case, the projection of Ω is a lower
dimensional hypercube (corresponding to a subset of Ω).
Note that Ω lies in the non-negative orthant and the non-
negative orthant is an acute cone with the vertex a0 = 0, so
the assumption of Theorem 5.3 holds and hence the acute
angles hold for the hypercube.
Proof of Corollary 5.5. Again, by symmetry, it suffices to
consider faces of the form X = {ei : i ∈ [k]} for k ∈
{1, . . . , n}. Let a0 = e1. The affine space A′ is described
by
A′ = {a ∈ Rn : (a− e1) · (ei − e1) = 0 for 2 ≤ i ≤ k}
= {a ∈ Rn : a[i] = a[1]− 1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ k}
where we use notation a[i] to denote the i-th coordinate.
The projection of ej for j > k into A′ is of the form
e′j = ej +
k∑
i=2
αj [i] (ei − e1) ,
for some αj [i] ∈ R, i.e.,
e′j [i] =

−∑ki′=2 αj [i′] if i = 1
αj [i] if i ∈ {2, . . . , k}
1 if i = j
0 otherwise.
The only solution of the above form that lies in A′ is ob-
tained by setting αj [i] = −1/k, yielding
e′j [i] =

1− 1/k if i = 1
−1/k if i ∈ {2, . . . , k}
1 if i = j
0 otherwise.
Therefore, for any pair of projections e′j , e
′
j′ for j, j
′ > k,
and j 6= j′, we have
(e′j − e1) · (e′j′ − e1) = 1/k > 0 ,
so the projection of Ω is in an acute cone, i.e., acute angles
hold.
Proof of Theorem 5.6. We begin by characterizing an a1-
perpendicular to a face X 6= Ω at q. Let ν := p(q) 6∈
aff(X), so the ambient space of the perpendicular is
aff(X ∪ {ν}). Thus, for a given X and q, we will have
the same im γ and the same order on ν ∈ im γ for any
valid a1 ∈ M˜ which allows to define the a1-perpendicular
to X at q. Recall that Pq is the probability measure over Ω
defined by
Pq(ω) = e
q·ω−C(q)
and note that Pq(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. Recall that
ν =
∑
ω∈Ω
Pq(ω)ω .
Let Xc = Ω\X . Separate ν into components correspond-
ing to x ∈ X and ω ∈ Xc:
νX =
1
Pq(X)
∑
x∈X
Pq(x)x ,
νXc =
1
Pq(Xc)
∑
ω∈Xc
Pq(ω)ω ,
i.e.,
ν = Pq(X)νX + Pq(X
c)νXc .
Since νX ∈ aff(X), we have
aff(X ∪ {ν}) = aff(X ∪ {νXc}) . (G.2)
We will show that im γ consists exactly of the points (1 −
α˜)νX + α˜νXc for α˜ ∈ (0, 1).
Consider ν′ ∈ im γ and q′ ∈ p−1(ν′)∩ (q+X⊥). For any
x′, x ∈ X , we have
(q′ − q) · (x′ − x) = 0 ,
so
q′ · (x′ − x) = q · (x′ − x) ,
and hence
Pq′(x
′)
Pq′(x)
= eq
′·(x′−x) = eq·(x
′−x) =
Pq(x
′)
Pq(x)
.
Since this holds for arbitrary x, x′ ∈ X , we obtain
Pq′(x)
Pq(x)
=
Pq′(X)
Pq(X)
for all x ∈ X . (G.3)
Since ν′ is in the ambient space of the perpendicular, which
is aff(X ∪ {ν}), by Eq. (G.2), we obtain
ν′ ∈ aff(X ∪ {νXc}) ,
so ν′ can be written in the form
ν′ =
∑
x∈X
α(x)x+
(
1−
∑
x∈X
α(x)
)
νXc (G.4)
for some α(x) ∈ R for x ∈ X . Also,
ν′ =
∑
x∈X
Pq′(x)x+
∑
ω∈Xc
Pq′(ω)ω .
By the affine independence of Ω, we therefore must have
α(x) = Pq′(x). Plugging this into Eq. (G.4), we obtain
ν′ =
(∑
x∈X
Pq′(x)x
)
+ Pq′(X
c)νXc
=
(
Pq′(X)
Pq(X)
∑
x∈X
Pq(x)x
)
+ Pq′(X
c)νXc
= Pq′(X)νX + Pq′(X
c)νXc
where the second equality follows by Eq. (G.3). Thus, in-
deed ν′ = (1− α˜)νX + α˜νXc for α˜ = Pq′(Xc).
For any I ⊆ [0, 1], let
JI := {(1− α˜)νX + α˜νXc : α˜ ∈ I} .
So far we have shown that im γ ⊆ J(0,1); we next argue
that J(0,1) ⊆ im γ. We do this by exploiting the continuity
properties of γ.
For any α˜, note that(
(1− α˜)νX + α˜νXc
)
∈
(
aff(X) + α˜(νXc − νX)
)
= Aλ
for a suitable λ. Let α˜0 and λ0 be the values associated
with ν = p(q); note that both are greater than zero. Then,
for any λ, the α˜ such that
(1− α˜)νX + α˜νXc ∈ Aλ
is obtained as α˜(λ) := α˜0λ/λ0. The domain Λ of γ is an
open subset of the real line and therefore it is a union of dis-
joint open intervals. Let (
¯
λ, λ¯) be the interval containing
λ0. For the sake of contradiction assume that α˜(
¯
λ) > 0.
Then J[α˜(
¯
λ),α˜0] is a compact subset of riM, and there-
fore by Theorem F.3, its intersection with im γ should be
compact as well. However, by the selection of
¯
λ, the in-
tersection equals J(α˜(
¯
λ),α˜0], which is not compact, yield-
ing a contradiction. Similarly, we obtain a contradiction if
α˜(λ¯) < 1. Therefore, α˜(
¯
λ) ≤ 0 and α˜(λ¯) ≥ 1, showing
that J(0,1) ⊆ im γ, and hence in fact J(0,1) = im γ.
Now we are ready to prove the theorem. Let ν′ ∈ im γ
such that ν′  ν, and let q ∈ p−1(ν), q′ ∈ p−1(ν′). Use
the notation P := Pq and P ′ := Pq′ , and write
(q′ − q) · (ω − x) = ln
(
eq
′·ω
eq′·x
· e
q·x
eq·ω
)
= ln
(
P ′(ω)
P ′(x)
· P (x)
P (ω)
)
= ln
(
P ′(ω)
P (ω)
· P (x)
P ′(x)
)
.
For ω ∈ Xc, our characterization of the perpendicular im-
plies that P (x) ≥ P ′(x) and P (ω) ≤ P (ω′) since ν′ has a
larger (or equal) coefficient α˜ than ν, because it is further
(or equally) away from νX . Thus, the above expression is
non-negative, yielding the acute angles property.
Proof of Theorem 5.7. Let µ ∈ M˜, q ∈ p−1(M˜) and let
im γ be the µ-perpendicular to X at q. Note that the per-
pendicular is well defined only if X is a singleton, say
X = {x}, and µ 6= x. Let {x′} be the other singleton
face ofM. Thus, im γ = aff({x, x′}) ∩ (ri domC∗) with
the direction from x towards x′. Note that K(X) = {u :
u · (x′ − x) ≥ 0}. Let ν = p(q) and let ν′  ν, i.e.,
ν′ − ν = λ(x′ − x) for some λ > 0. Pick q′ ∈ p−1(ν′),
which exists, because ν′ ∈ ri domC∗. By convexity, we
have
0 ≤ (q′ − q) · (∇C(q′)−∇C(q)) = (q′ − q) · (ν′ − ν)
= λ(q′ − q) · (x′ − x) ,
i.e., q′ − q ∈ K(X).
Proof of Theorem 5.8. Let M1 = conv(Ω1) and M2 =
(conv Ω2). We first argue that M = conv(Ω1 × Ω2) =
(conv Ω1) × (conv Ω2) = M1 × M2. For i ∈ {1, 2},
let νi ∈ Mi, i.e., for some probability measure Pi on Ωi,
we have Eωi∼Pi [ωi] = νi. Defining the probability mea-
sure P on Ω by P (ω1, ω2) = P1(ω1)P2(ω2), we obtain
E(ω1,ω2)∼P [(ω1, ω2)] = (ν1, ν2), i.e., (ν1, ν2) ∈ M. Con-
versely, let (ν1, ν2) ∈ M, i.e., for some measure P on
Ω, E(ω1,ω2)∼P [(ω1, ω2)] = (ν1, ν2). But this also means
that E(ω1,ω2)∼P [ωi] = νi for i ∈ {1, 2}, so νi ∈ Mi for
i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus,M =M1 ×M2.
We also have domC = (domC1) × (domC2) and
ri domC = (ri domC1)×(ri domC2), which implies that
M˜ ⊆ M˜1 × M˜2.
We next show that X is a face of M if and only if X =
X1 × X2 where X1 is a face of M1 and X2 is a face of
M2. A face X ofM is characterized by a vector u and a
scalar c such that
u · x = c for x ∈ X
u · ω > c for ω ∈ Ω\X .
If X1 is a face ofM1 characterized by u1 and c1, and X2
is a face ofM2 characterized by u2 and c2, then we imme-
diately obtain that X1 × X2 is a face ofM characterized
by u = (u1, u2) and c = c1 + c2. Conversely, assume X is
a face ofM characterized by u = (u1, u2) and c. We first
show that X is a Cartesian product. We proceed by contra-
diction and assume that (x1, x2) ∈ X and (x′1, x′2) ∈ X ,
but (x1, x′2) 6∈ X . By assumption:
u1 · x1 + u2 · x2 = c
u1 · x′1 + u2 · x′2 = c
−u1 · x1 − u2 · x′2 < −c
Summing the above three yields:
u1 · x′1 + u2 · x2 < c
which is a contradiction withX being a face. By symmetry,
we also obtain (x′1, x2) ∈ X , henceX = X1×X2 for some
X1 ⊆ Ω1 and X2 ⊆ Ω2. Let (x1, x2) be some element of
X . Note that X1 must be a face of M1 characterized by
u1 and c1 := u1 · x1, because otherwise, there would exist
ω1 ∈ Ω1\X1 such that u1 · ω1 ≤ c1 = u1 · x1, i.e.,
u1 · ω1 + u2 · x2 ≤ u1 · x1 + u2 · x2
which would contradict X being a face, since (ω1, x2) 6∈
X . By symmetry, we also obtain that X2 is a face ofM2.
Let γ be the a-perpendicular toX at q, where a = (a1, a2),
X = X1 × X2 and q = (q1, q2). Note that a ∈ M˜,
p(q) ∈ M˜ implies that ai ∈ M˜i, pi(qi) ∈ M˜i because
M˜ ⊆ M˜1 × M˜2. The optimization of D(q, ν) over Aλ in
the definition of the perpendicular decomposes into inde-
pendent convex problems in ν1 and ν2, because aff(X) =
aff(X1)×aff(X2) andD(q, ν) = D1(q1, ν1)+D2(q2, ν2),
where D1 and D2 are the divergences derived from C1 and
C2. Thus, for any point ν′ ∈ im γ such that ν′  p(q),
we obtain that for i ∈ {1, 2} the components ν′i lie on the
ai-perpendicular to Xi at qi and ν′i  pi(qi). Let x =
(x1, x2) ∈ X and ω = (ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω. Then by acute angles
assumption, we can choose q′i ∈ p−1i (ν′i) ∩ [qi + K(Xi)].
Let q′ = (q′1, q
′
2). Note that q
′ ∈ p−1(ν′). We will argue
that also (q′ − q) ∈ K(X):
(q′ − q) · (ω − x) =
∑
i∈{1,2}
(q′i − qi) · (ωi − xi) ≥ 0 ,
where the last inequality follows, because (q′i − qi) ∈
K(Xi). Thus, the acute angles assumption holds for C and
Ω.
H PROOF OF THEOREM 5.2
In this section we give the complete proof of Theorem 5.2,
with the revised definition of budget additivity, which re-
quires that q0 be arbitrage-free (see Appendix C.1). The
proof proceeds in several steps. Let ν0 = p(q0). Assuming
acute angles, we begin by constructing an oriented curve L
joining ν0 with µ, by sequentially choosing portions of per-
pendiculars for monotonically decreasing active sets. We
then show that budget additivity holds for any solutions
with prices in L, and finally show that the curve L is the
locus of the optimal prices of solutions Qˆ(q0), as well as
optimal prices of solutions Qˆ(q) for any q ∈ Qˆ(q0).
Part 1: Construction of the solution pathL In this part,
we construct:
• a sequence of prices ν0, ν1, . . . , νk with ν0 = p(q0)
and νk = µ
• a sequence of oriented curves `0, . . . , `k−1 where each
`i goes from νi to νi+1
• a monotone sequence of sets Ω ⊇ X0 ⊃ X1 ⊃
· · · ⊃ Xk = ∅, such that the following minimal-
ity property holds: Xi is the minimal face for all
ν ∈ (im `i)\{νi+1} for i ≤ k − 1, and Xk is the
minimal face for νk.
• a sequence of states q1, . . . , qk−1 such that qi ∈
p−1(νi) ∩ [qi−1 +K(Xi−1)]
The curves `i will be referred to as segments. The curve
obtained by concatenating the segments `0 through `k−1
will be called the solution path and denoted L. In the spe-
cial case that ν0 = µ, we have k = 0, X0 = ∅ and L is a
degenerate curve with imL = {µ}.
If ν0 6= µ, we construct the sequence of segments it-
eratively. Let X0 6= ∅ be the minimal face such that
ν0 ∈ conv(X0 ∪ {µ}). By the minimality, µ 6∈ aff(X0).
Let γ be the µ-perpendicular to aff(X0) at q0. The curve γ
passes through ν0 and eventually reaches the boundary of
conv(X0 ∪ {µ}) at some ν1 by continuity of γ (see Theo-
rem F.3). Let segment `0 be the portion of γ going from ν0
to ν1.
This construction gives us the first segment `0. There are
two possibilities:
1. ν1 = µ; in this case we are done;
2. ν1 lies on a lower-dimensional face of conv(X0 ∪
{µ}); in this case, we pick some q1 ∈ p−1(ν1)∩ [q0 +
K(X0)], which can be done by the acute angles as-
sumption, and use the above construction again, start-
ing with q1, and obtaining a new set X1 ⊂ X0 and a
new segment `1; and iterate.
The above process eventually ends, because with each iter-
ation, the size of the active set decreases. This construction
yields monotonicity of Xi and the minimality property.
The above construction yields a specific sequence of qi ∈
p−1(νi) ∩ [qi−1 +K(Xi−1)]. We will now show that actu-
ally qi ∈ p−1(νi) ∩ (q0 + X⊥i−1) and that the construc-
tion of L is independent of the specific q1, q2, . . . , qk−1
chosen. To begin, note that from our construction, we
can write qi = q0 + u0 + u1 + . . . + ui−1 for some
uj ∈ K(Xj) ⊆ X⊥j . Since Xi ⊆ Xj for j = 1, . . . , i− 1,
we actually have uj ∈ X⊥i−1, so qi ∈ (q0 + X⊥i−1). Note
that X⊥i−1 ⊆ X⊥i , and according to Proposition 4.3, any
qi ∈ p−1(νi)∩ (q0 +X⊥i ) yields the same µ-perpendicular
to aff(Xi) and hence the same segment `i. By induc-
tion it therefore follows that the segments `0, . . . , `k−1 are
uniquely determined by our construction regardless of the
specific q1, . . . , qk−1.
Part 1’: The solution path starting at a midpoint Let
ν ∈ imL, and q ∈ p−1(ν) ∩ (q0 + X⊥ν ), and let L′ be the
solution path if the initial state were q rather than q0. By a
similar reasoning as in the previous paragraph, we see that
L′ is a restriction of L starting with ν.
Part 2: Budget additivity for points on L Let ν, ν′ ∈
imL such that ν  ν′. Let q ∈ Qˆ(ν; q0) and q′ ∈ Qˆ(ν′; q)
such that q ∈ Qˆ(B; q0) and q′ ∈ Qˆ(B′; q). Note that by
Proposition C.2, q is arbitrage-free. In this part we show
that q′ ∈ Qˆ(B +B′; q0).
First, consider the case that ν′ = µ. To see that q′ ∈
Qˆ(B + B′; q0), first note that the constraints of Convex
Program (2.1) hold, because U(q′, ω; q0) = U(q′, ω; q) +
U(q, ω; q0) ≥ −B′ − B for all ω by path independence of
the utility function. As noted in the introduction, in the ab-
sence of constraints, the utility U(q¯, µ; q0) is maximized at
any q¯ with p(q¯) = µ. Thus, q′ is a global maximizer of the
utility and satisfies the constraints, so q′ ∈ Qˆ(B +B′; q0).
If ν = µ, we must also have ν′ = µ and the statement holds
by previous reasoning.
In the remainder, we only analyze the case ν  ν′ ≺
µ. This means that ν ∈ (im `i)\{νi+1} and ν′ ∈
(im `j)\{νj+1} for i ≤ j. By Theorem 3.4, we therefore
must have q ∈ [q0 + K(Xi)] and q′ ∈ [q + K(Xj)]. By
anti-monotonicity of witness cones, K(Xj) ⊇ K(Xi) and
hence, q′ ∈ [q0 +K(Xj)], yielding
q′ ∈ Qˆ(ν′; q0) .
We now argue that the budgets add up. Let x ∈ Xj ⊆ Xi.
By Lemma 3.1, we obtain that
q ∈ Qˆ(B; q0) for B = −U(q, x; q0) ,
q′ ∈ Qˆ(B′; q) for B′ = −U(q′, x; q) ,
q′ ∈ Qˆ(B¯; q0) for B¯ = −U(q′, x; q0) .
However, by path independence of the utility function
B¯ = −U(q′, x; q0) = −U(q′, x; q)−U(q, x; q0) = B′+B.
Part 3: L as the locus of all solutions In this part we
show that
Qˆ(q0) =
⋃
ν∈imL
Qˆ(ν; q0) .
We will begin by defining sets of budgets for which the
optimal price is ν and show that their union across all ν ∈
imL is a closed interval. Since both ν0, µ ∈ imL, this
will mean that we have included price vectors across all
possible budgets. The statement of Part 3 will then follow
by Theorem 2.2.
Let x ∈ Xk−1 =
⋂k−1
i=0 Xi and let B(q) := −U(q, x; q0).
Further, for ν ∈ im `i, let
Bi(ν) := {B(q) : q ∈ p−1(ν) ∩ [q0 +K(Xi)]} .
From Corollary 3.5, we know that for ν ∈ (im `i)\{νi+1},
Bi(ν) is exactly the set of budgets for which ν is the opti-
mal price vector. The setBi(νi+1) is potentially only a sub-
set of such budgets (corresponding toXi being the tight set,
rather than the actual minimal setXi+1). First we show that
Bi(ν) is non-empty for ν ∈ im `i. Let ν ∈ im `i. By acute
angles assumption, there exists q ∈ p−1(ν)∩ [qi+K(Xi)].
Furthermore, qj ∈ [qj−1 + K(Xj−1)] for j = 1, . . . , i, so
we can write q = q0 + u0 + · · · + ui where uj ∈ K(Xj).
By anti-monotonicity of witness cones, K(Xj) ⊆ K(Xi)
for j = 1, . . . , i, so we actually have uj ∈ K(Xi) and thus
q ∈ [q0 +K(Xi)], proving that the set Bi(ν) is non-empty.
We will next show that
Bi(`i) :=
⋃
ν∈im `i
Bi(ν)
is an interval.
Consider a fixed ν ∈ im `i. For q ∈ p−1(ν), we have
C(q) = q · ν − C∗(ν), i.e., B(q) is linear in q over
q ∈ p−1(ν). Since the set p−1(ν) is closed and convex,
so is p−1(ν) ∩ [q0 + K(Xi)]. The latter set is also non-
empty, hence the set Bi(ν) must be a non-empty closed
interval. LetBmini (ν) andB
max
i (ν) be the lower and upper
endpoints ofBi(ν). Since the budget additivity holds along
L (by Part 2), we must have thatBmaxi is non-decreasing on
`i. Next note that for ν 6= ν′ the setsBi(ν) andBi(ν′) must
be disjoint. This implies that Bmaxi is actually increasing
and so is Bmini .
We next show that Bmaxi is right-continuous on `i. Let
M := {(ν, q) : ν ∈ im `i, q ∈ p−1(ν)}. By Theorem F.3,
the set M can be written C+(0⊕L⊥) where C is compact.
LetM ′ := {(ν, q) : ν ∈ im `i, q ∈ p−1(ν)∩[q0+K(Xi)]}.
Since the set [q0 +K(Xi)] is closed, the setM ′ can be writ-
ten as C′ + (0 ⊕ L⊥) where C′ is compact. To show that
Bmaxi is right-continuous, pick ν ∈ im `i and let {ν′t}∞t=1
be a sequence of ν′t ∈ `i, ν′t  ν such that limt→∞ ν′t = ν.
Pick q′t such that (ν
′
t, q
′
t) ∈ C′ and B(q′t) = Bmaxi (ν′t). By
compactness, the sequence {(ν′t, q′t)}∞t=1 must have a clus-
ter point (ν, q) ∈ C′, and by continuity of B, we must have
limt→∞Bmaxi (ν
′
t) = limt→∞B(q
′
t) = B(q) ≤ Bmaxi (ν).
The right continuity ofBmaxi now follows by monotonicity.
By symmetric reasoning, Bmini must be left-continuous.
Now for the sake of contradiction, assume thatBi(`i) is not
an interval, i.e., assume that there is a value B∗ 6∈ Bi(`i)
such that some higher and lower values are in Bi(`i). By
monotonicity, there must exist ν∗ such thatBmaxi (ν) < B
∗
for ν ≺ ν∗ and Bmini (ν) > B∗ for ν  ν∗. However, this
means that
Bmini (ν
∗) = lim
ν↑ν∗
Bmini (ν
∗) ≤ lim
ν↑ν∗
Bmaxi (ν
∗) ≤ B∗
and
Bmaxi (ν
∗) = lim
ν↓ν∗
Bmaxi (ν
∗) ≥ lim
ν↓ν∗
Bmini (ν
∗) ≥ B∗
which means that B∗ ∈ Bi(ν∗) yielding a contradiction.
Finally, note that Bi(νi+1) ⊆ Bi+1(νi+1) for i ≤ k − 1,
hence
⋃k−1
i=1 Bi(`i) is an interval as well.
Part 3’: L as the locus of solutions starting at a mid-
point Let ν ∈ imL and q ∈ Qˆ(ν; q0). Since Qˆ(ν; q0) ⊆
p−1(ν) ∩ (q0 + X⊥ν ), Part 1’ yields that the solution path
L′ for q coincides with the portion of L starting at ν. By
Proposition C.2, q is arbitrage-free, so the reasoning of the
previous part can be applied to L′, yielding the following
statement:
Qˆ(q) =
⋃
ν′∈imL:
ν′ν
Qˆ(ν′; q) .
Part 4: Proof of the theorem Let B,B′ ≥ 0 and q ∈
Qˆ(B; q0) and q′ ∈ Qˆ(B′; q). From Parts 3 and 3’, we know
that q ∈ Qˆ(ν; q0) and q′ ∈ Qˆ(ν′; q) for some ν, ν′ ∈ imL
such that ν  ν′. By Part 2, we therefore obtain that q′ ∈
Qˆ(B +B′; q0), proving the theorem.
